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The Myth of the Independent
Physician: Implications for
Health Law, Policy, and Ethics
Jessica Mantel†
Abstract
Physicians increasingly are moving away from solo and small
group practices to join large organizations, a trend now accelerating
with the implementation of health care reform. Because physicians
control as much as ninety percent of all health care spending,
understanding how health care organizations influence physicians’
treatment decisions is of fundamental importance, particularly for
policymakers, scholars, and ethicists concerned with the quality, cost,
and rationing of health care. Informed by research in the fields of
psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics, this Article argues
that physicians employed by or affiliated with health care
organizations are part of organizational dynamics that profoundly
influence their treatment decisions. Unfortunately, much of health
law, policy, and ethics narrowly focus on the individual physician,
failing to appreciate the powerful link between organizational culture
and physicians’ clinical decisions. Scholars, policymakers, and ethicists
therefore must give greater attention to the organization. Of
particular concern are health organizations with cultures that bias
physicians’ clinical decision making in ways that lead to the provision
of poor-quality or inefficient care or the withholding of necessary care.
This Article concludes with a discussion of possible ways to promote
more virtuous organizational cultures that minimize these risks while
respecting community standards of compassion and fairness.
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Introduction
In guaranteeing access to health insurance for millions of
Americans, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1
(“Affordable Care Act”) brings us closer to the goal of universal
access to medical care. To make universal access sustainable in the
long term, however, policymakers must go beyond increased access to
care and address both rising health care costs and deficiencies in the
quality of care provided to patients. In addition, impending changes
in the way insurers and government health care programs pay for care
raises new challenges.2 By placing health care providers on a budget
1.

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).

2.

For example, under global payments, or full capitation, providers receive
a single payment from a payor for each patient they care for. The
global, or capitated, payments frequently cover all of the cost of treating
patients over the course of year, although sometimes certain categories
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for patient care, these payment reforms will lead to health care
providers rationing medical care.3 This raises important questions
regarding how best to ensure that they do so in a manner that is both
reasonable and equitable and that patients are not unfairly denied
medically appropriate care.4
With physicians controlling as much as ninety percent of all
health care spending,5 addressing cost, quality, and health-rationing
concerns requires an understanding of how physicians make clinical
decisions. Importantly, the issue of physician decision making must be
considered against the backdrop of a rapidly transforming health care
system that has seen a steady decline in the number of physicians
practicing in solo and small group practices and an increase in
physicians affiliating with large organizations.6 Informed by research
of care are carved out, such as pharmaceuticals or hospital care. In other
words, the provider assumes the entire financial risk of treating the
patient population and thus must work within a budget. See Jeff
Goldsmith, Physician’s Foundation, The Future of Medical
Practice: Creating Options for Practicing Physicians to
Control Their Professional Destiny 38 (2012) (explaining global
risk). Similarly, bundled payment systems−which employ a single fixed
payment for an episode of care that is allocated among all providers
treating a patient−force providers to provide care within a fixed budget.
See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Finally, shared savings and
shared risk payment models also incentivize providers to work within a
budget by rewarding those who meet or exceed targeted cost savings or
penalizing those who fail to do so. See Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care
Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2012) (explaining the shared savings and
shared risk models for accountable care organizations).
3.

See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1427 (arguing that payment reforms such
as shared savings that require providers to lower costs will necessitate
“gatekeeping,” with providers determining which services should be
provided to individual patients).

4.

See id. at 1427–28, 1436 (describing the need for regulatory oversight of
providers who assume financial risk in order to ensure providers
appropriately balance cost and quality considerations and do not
inappropriately withhold care).

5.

See John Eisenberg, Physician Utilization: The State of Research About
Physicians’ Practice Patterns, 40 MED. CARE 1016, 1016 (2002) (noting that
physician decisions govern as much as ninety percent of how health care
dollars are spent); Alan Sager & Deborah Socolar, Bos. Univ. Sch.
of Pub. Health, Health Costs Absorb One-Quarter of Economic
Growth, 2000–2005, at 29 (2005) (stating that physicians’ decisions
“control fully 87 percent of the personal health care dollar”).

6.

See, e.g., Stephen L. Isaacs et al., The Independent Physician—Going,
Going . . ., 360 New Eng. J. Med. 655, 655–57 (2009) (stating that
“[t]he percentage of U.S. physicians who own their own practice has
been declining at an annual rate of approximately 2% for at least the
past 25 years” and that the percentage of physicians in small practices—
practices with ten or fewer physicians—“decreased by nearly 15%
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in the fields of psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics, this
Article is the first to provide a comprehensive theory of how the
organizational cultures of these health care organizations (HCOs)
powerfully influence physicians’ clinical judgments. The Article also
discusses the implications of this new theory for health law, policy,
and ethics.
Many health law scholars, policymakers, and ethicists
conceptualize patient care as being provided at the level of the
individual physician, as opposed to by the HCO. The focus on the
individual physician reflects the fact physicians retain a high degree of
autonomy over their patients’ care given the inherent nature and
complexity of medicine.7 Yet despite their professional autonomy,
physicians employed by or affiliated with HCOs are part of
organizational dynamics that powerfully influence their treatment
decisions. In particular, an HCO’s organizational culture—its shared
norms, values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior—influence both
how a physician perceives a patient’s situation and the thought
patterns, assumptions, and values that guide the physician’s clinical
decision making. Focusing on the deeds of individual physicians and
ignoring the influence of the organization thus leads to a factually
inaccurate account of patient care upon which to base health care
policy.
In recognition of the organization’s role in shaping physicians’
treatment decisions, some areas of health law, policy, and ethics have
broadened their focus to include the HCO, particularly in the area of
payment policy.8 Unfortunately, other areas of health law, policy, and
between 1996 and 2004”). Indeed, most physicians believe that “the
traditional model of independent private practice is either ‘on shaky
ground’ or ‘is a dinosaur soon to go extinct.’” Merritt Hawkins,
Health Reform and the Decline of Private Physician
Practice: A White Paper Examining the Effects of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on Physician
Practices in the United States 46 (2010). The types of
organizations physicians are joining vary but include integrated delivery
systems, multispecialty group practices, and accountable care
organizations. Many physicians are also becoming employees of
hospitals. See Suzanne M. Kirchoff, Cong. Research Serv.,
R42880, Physician Practices: Background, Organization, and
Market Consolidation (2013) (describing the types of organizations
with which physicians affiliate and the increase in hospital employment
among physicians).
7.

See Theodore W. Ruger, Can a Patient-Centered Ethos Be OtherRegarding? Ought It Be?, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1513, 1516 (2010)
(stating that although medical care is provided in a complex delivery
system, medical decisions remain devolved to the level of the individual
doctor and patient).

8.

See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing recent shifts in
how Medicare and other payors pay for health care).
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ethics narrowly emphasize physicians’ individual competence levels,
their personal values, and potential conflicts of interest. For example,
although courts have adopted concepts of institutional liability for
poor-quality care, malpractice cases based on alleged physician error
generally treat physicians as isolated actors who are individually
responsible for their patient-care decisions.9 Similarly, with respect to
whether certain financial arrangements may adversely impact the
quality of patient care, many commentators focus on financial
incentives operating at the level of the individual physician,
minimizing the risk of financial incentives tied to a group’s or
organization’s performance.10 Various laws governing financial

9.

See infra Part IV.C.1 (noting that even with various forms of
institutional liability, the focus in many malpractice cases remains on
the conduct of the individual physician).

10.

For example, in commenting on health maintenance organization
(HMO) physician-incentive plans, the General Accounting Office (GAO;
now called the Government Accountability Office) concluded that
“incentive plans that base the amount of payment on the cost
performance of individual physicians have a relatively higher potential
to adversely affect quality of care than do plans based on group cost
performance.” U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, GAO/HRD-89-29,
Medicare: Physician Incentive Payments by Prepaid Health
Plans Could Lower Quality of Care 25 (1988). Others similarly
have questioned whether incentives for individual physicians “apply
undue pressure to conserve resources and may lead to inadequate
medical care for patients,” with the American Medical Association
(AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommending incentives
based on group performance rather than individual incentives. Stephen
A. Magnus, Physicians’ Financial Incentives in Five Dimensions: A
Conceptual Framework for HMO Managers, 24 Health Care Mgmt.
Rev. 57, 65 (1999). Relying on classic economic theory, commentators
have argued that financial incentives tied to the group’s performance,
rather than the individual physician’s performance, have little effect on
a physician because of the weak link between the individual physician’s
clinical decisions and any financial benefit the physician derives from
the group-based payment. As explained by the GAO, “[t]he more
physicians and the more patients whose treatment costs determine the
size of the available incentive funds, the more remote individual
treatment decisions become from the amount of payment received and
the less likely reduction of quality will occur.” U.S. Gen. Acct.
Office, supra note 10, at 25; see also Stephen R. Latham, Regulation
of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.
399, 410 (1996) (“The fact that risk is spread over more encounters
[with group-based financial incentives] also means that incentives
applied to the behavior of intermediary groups, such as hospitalphysician joint ventures or physician practice groups, should be less
intense than incentive plans that apply directly to the clinical choices of
individual physicians.”).
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arrangements in the health care sector reflect this focus on the
individual physician’s financial incentives.11
An approach to physician behavior that narrowly focuses on the
individual physician, however, overlooks the fact that physicians often
are members of dynamic organizations that profoundly influence
physicians’ professional judgments. While I do not mean to advance
an argument for abandoning or weakening regulation of individual
physicians and their financial incentives, a model of physician
behavior that incorporates the impact of organizational culture reveals
the inadequacies of focusing too much on individual physicians and
too little on HCOs.12 Of particular concern are HCOs with
organizational cultures that bias physicians’ treatment decisions in
ways that result in poor-quality or inefficient care or the withholding
of necessary care. Scholars and policymakers concerned about the cost
and quality of patient care and the fairness of health-rationing
decisions must give greater attention to how best to promote HCOs
with virtuous organizational cultures.
Part I discusses the trend of physicians moving away from solo
and small group practices and affiliating with large HCOs.
Understanding how this shift impacts physicians’ professional
judgments requires a general understanding of how physicians make
clinical decisions. Part II addresses this issue, explaining that, when
faced with medical uncertainty or difficult value trade-offs, physicians’
professional judgments are guided by cognitive frameworks, or
schemas, that organize their knowledge, assumptions, and values.
Drawing on the work of sociologists, psychologists, and
economists, Part III then argues that HCOs’ organizational cultures
profoundly influence physicians’ clinical decisions by shaping
11.

For example, although referrals between physicians in the same group
practice enhance the group’s income, the Stark law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn
(2012), exempts from the general prohibition on physician self-referrals
referrals between physicians in the same group practice unless the
referring physician is compensated in a manner that takes into account
the volume and value of such referrals. See id. § 1395nn(a) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011) (general prohibition against physician self-referrals);
id. § 1395nn(b)(2)
(in-office
ancillary
services
exception);
id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(A) (defining “group practice”). The Stark law
similarly exempts from the general prohibition on physician self-referrals
distributions of an organization’s profits and productivity bonuses paid
to a physician as long as they do not relate to the volume or value of
the physician’s referrals. Id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(B)(i).

12.

See Ann Barry Flood & Mary L. Fennell, Through the Lenses of
Organizational Sociology: The Role of Organizational Theory and
Research in Conceptualizing and Examining Our Health Care System,
35 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 154, 163 (1995) (stating that models of
health care need to be expanded to fit the complexities of the health
care system, including the noneconomic factors involved, “so that we
can understand the inadequacies of financial-based policies”).
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physicians’ cognitive schemas. Specifically, Part III.A demonstrates
the effect a physician’s organizational peers have on the physician’s
professional judgment, particularly in conditions of clinical
uncertainty. Part III.B then describes how a physician’s identification
with an HCO engenders both loyalty to the organization and
internalization of the organization’s norms and values. Part III.C
concludes with a discussion of how a physician’s self-interest—as
shaped by the HCO—subconsciously biases clinical judgments by
causing the physician to apply self-serving cognitive schemas. The
cumulative effect of this dynamic is to produce among an HCO’s
physicians a shared practice style that reflects commonality in values
and philosophies.
Finally, Part IV examines the implications of the link between
physicians’ patient-care decisions and HCOs’ organizational culture
for health law, policy, and ethics. First, Part IV.A argues that the
field of health ethics should give greater attention to HCOs’
organizational ethics and reexamine existing professional ethical
principles that reflect a paradigm of the independent physician.
Part IV.B then considers whether regulators should mandate that
HCOs adopt certain internal structures or arrangements believed to
promote more virtuous organizational cultures. Part IV.C concludes
with a discussion of various legal and policy reforms that would
impose greater accountability on HCOs for the cost and quality of
patient care.

I. The Rise of the Health Care Organization
For much of the twentieth century, the health care system was
dominated by independent physicians practicing as solo practitioners
or in small groups.13 Free from corporate or bureaucratic controls,
physicians enjoyed high levels of professional autonomy and
maintained primary authority over the provision of medical care.14
This system of “professional dominance” was reinforced by a payment
system that reimbursed health providers on a fee-for-service basis,
paying providers a separate payment for each unit of service they
provided without regard to its quality or cost-effectiveness.15 The past
13.

See Thomas G. Rundall et al., A Theory of Physician-Hospital
Integration: Contending Institutional and Market Logics in the Health
Care Field, 45 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 102, 104 (2004) (noting that
for most of the past century, physicians organized themselves into solo
practices or small groups).

14.

See id. at 103 (stating that the traditional form of organizing physician
services “maintain[ed] physicians’ autonomy from organizational controls
and authority over medical care decisions”).

15.

See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1403–04 (explaining fee-for-service
reimbursement).
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few decades, however, have seen a steady decline in solo and small
group physician practices and the emergence of new delivery models
centered on large organizations.16 Implementation of health care
reform has only accelerated this trend.17
Frustrated with the rising cost of health care, in the 1980s
employers, insurers, and policymakers began demanding that the
health care sector achieve greater efficiencies in the provision of care.18
So began the era of managed care, as private sector payors and
government health programs changed how they contract with and
reimburse physicians and other health care providers.19 Employers and
private insurers fostered greater competition among physicians and
hospitals by contracting with a limited number of providers, leading
many physicians and hospitals to agree to discounted reimbursement
rates.20 In addition, both private and public payors moved away from

16.

See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that the
independent, private physician practice model will be largely replaced by
models of care built around larger organizations, including accountable
care organizations, large independent physician groups, and large
aligned groups); see also Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 655–56 (noting
that the percentage of physicians who own their own practices has been
declining at a rate of approximately two percent for the past twenty-five
years and that the percentage of physicians in small practices—practices
with ten or fewer physicians—decreased by nearly fifteen percent
between 1996 and 2004).

17.

See Mary Witt et al., Cal. HealthCare Found., PhysicianHospital Integration in the Era of Health Reform 15 (2010)
(“Health care reform . . . has accelerated the trend toward
integration . . . .”); Clayton Harbeck, Hospital-Physician Alignment:
The 1990s Versus Now, Healthcare Fin. Mgmt., Apr. 2011, at 48,
50 (stating that health care reform has accelerated the trend of
collaborations between health systems and physicians, including
organizations employing physicians).

18.

See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kip Sullivan, How Large Employers Are
Shaping the Health Care Marketplace, 338 Health Pol’y Rep. 1003,
1003 (1998) (stating that in the late 1980s employers “began to rebel”
against rising health care premiums); Mark Hall, Institutional Control of
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 435–38 (1988) (discussing government initiatives
to address rising health care costs); Glen P. Mays et al., Managed Care
Rebound? Recent Changes in Health Plans’ Cost Containment
Strategies, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) W4-427, W4-427 (Aug.
11, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/08/11/
hlthaff.w4.427.short (noting that during the early 1990s, rising health
care spending led employers to prompt health plans to contain costs).

19.

See Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 103 (discussing changes since the
early 1980s in the way public and private health plans contract with
and compensate health care providers).

20.

See id. at 105 (stating that “public and private health plans began to
selectively contract with hospitals and physicians in order to use
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traditional fee-for-service payment to new methods of reimbursement
that gave providers financial incentives to reduce costs, such as
capitation and prospective payment.
Physicians, hospitals, and other providers responded to these
changes by entering into various types of collaborative arrangements.
Under these new delivery models, physicians no longer operated
separately from one another but to varying degrees jointly managed
patient care, often in collaboration with hospitals.21 For example,
physicians formed larger physician groups; joined independent
practice associations (IPAs)22 and physician-hospital organizations
(PHOs);23 and became employees of hospitals, hospital-owned medical
groups, and integrated delivery systems.24
While the types of HCOs physicians affiliated with varied greatly,
they all shared a common purpose—positioning physicians and other
health care providers to succeed in a world of managed care.25 The
competitive forces to drive down health care prices” and that new
methods of payment forced providers to find new ways to reduce costs);
For a definition of capitation, see supra note 2. Prospective payment
refers to paying hospitals a fixed payment for a hospital admission based
on a patient’s diagnosis, regardless of how many services were provided
to the patient. See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining
Medicare’s prospective payment system).
21.

See Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 105 (explaining that integration
generally “refers to activities and mechanisms used to achieve unity of
effort across different specialized areas”).

22.

An IPA is a network of physicians that collectively contract with HMOs
and managed care plans. IPA physicians maintain a high degree of
independence in that they continue to own and manage their own
practices, with the IPA’s primary function being to negotiate and
administer managed care contracts for its physicians. See Witt et al.,
supra note 17, at 15 (defining IPA).

23.

A PHO is a joint venture between a hospital or hospital system and
physicians to jointly contract with managed care organizations, with the
PHO distributing to physicians and hospitals funds received under these
contracts and providing administrative, management, and marketing
support. More recently, PHOs have tied their reimbursement of
physicians to the physicians’ performance on various quality indicators.
See Bhagwan Satiani & Patrick Vaccaro, A Critical Appraisal of
Physician-Hospital Integration Models, 51 J. Vascular Surgery 1046,
1049 (2010) (defining PHO).

24.

See Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., Two Decades of Organizational Change in
Health Care: What Have We Learned?, 61 Med. Care Res. & Rev.
247, 248 (2004) (describing the different types of arrangements
physicians entered into in response to managed care).

25.

See Keith D. Moore & Dean C. Coddington, Multiple Paths to
Integrated Health Care, Healthcare Fin. Mgmt., Dec. 2009, at 47, 54
(stating that integration efforts in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly
those involving hospitals, “[were] pursued with a single point of focus—
positioning for manage care contracting”).
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health care industry believed these collaborations offered two major
benefits. First, it was believed that these ventures gave providers a
vehicle for realizing the efficiencies and improved patient outcomes
demanded by payors.26 For example, these larger organizations
allowed for administrative and operational efficiencies due to
economies of scale.27 They also had the resources, capital, and
infrastructure to support acquiring health information systems,
improving the coordination of patient care across providers, and
developing clinical guidelines and protocols.28 Second, these new
organizations’ larger size and market share gave their members
greater bargaining power in their negotiations with managed care
plans. Physicians and other providers who formed HCOs thereby
obtained more favorable contract terms and payment rates than they
could have negotiated on their own.29
Despite the promise of these new delivery models, their results
were decidedly mixed.30 Lacking experience in medical management,
many HCOs failed to achieve the degree of clinical integration—the
coordination of patient care across the organization—that experts
believe is necessary for greater efficiencies and improved patient
26.

See Bazzoli et al., supra note 24, at 248 (discussing how during the
1980s and 1990s hospitals and physicians reorganized themselves “with
the stated purposes of improving efficiency, financial performance, longterm survival, community accountability, and patient outcomes,” with
their arrangements providing a platform for integration and
collaboration).

27.

See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 8 (stating that in the 1990s
physicians formed large group practices and IPAs in order to achieve
economies of scale).

28.

See generally Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 105 (stating that
partnerships such as those between hospitals and physicians gave
physicians access to the managerial infrastructure that would support
better management of patients); Howard S. Zuckerman et al.,
Physicians and Organizations: Strange Bedfellows or a Marriage Made
in Heaven?, 14 Frontiers Health Servs. Mgmt. 3, 12–13 (1998)
(describing how large organizations such as integrated delivery systems
could achieve economies of scale and enhance quality of care by
providing a coordinated system of care and “crucial resources such as
capital and information systems”).

29.

See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 8 (describing these earlier moves
toward integration as “aimed largely at gaining bargaining power”);
Steven W. Floyd et al., Institutional Forces in the Acceptance of Managed
Care Practices by Physicians, 30 Health Care Mgmt. Rev. 237, 242
(2005) (stating that the trend toward forming larger groups was for the
purpose of achieving the economic benefits of increased market power and
“the ability to obtain more favorable contract terms”).

30.

See Bazzoli et al., supra note 24, at 248 (“If one were to select at
random a set of health organizations and assess their success at
restructuring, one would observe mixed results.”).
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outcomes.31 Few large physician groups, for example, adopted
adequate utilization controls designed to lower costs and coordinate
care, such as clinical protocols or guidelines.32 Moreover, with health
information technology still in its infancy, HCOs often lacked the
data necessary to track service costs or develop clinical protocols and
guidelines.33 Many HCOs also failed to successfully integrate
31.

See generally Stephen M. Shortell et al., Remaking Health Care
in America: The Evolution of Organized Delivery Systems, 129
(2d ed. 2000) (describing the results of a 1996 study finding low levels of
clinical integration, and explaining that clinical integration is “the most
important element” in achieving cost-effective care); Goldsmith, supra
note 2, at 35 (discussing the failures of physician organizations to
effectively manage patient care). Clinical integration refers to greater
coordination of patient care across people, functions, activities, and sites
over time in order to enhance the quality and efficiency of patient care.
See Shortell et al., supra, at 129 (defining clinical integration).
Common activities of clinical integration include “utilization
management programs, scheduling and registration systems, information
systems that can track utilization by patient and provider, development
of care standards, continuous quality improvement programs, clinical
service lines, case management systems, population-based community
health models, disease and demand management systems, common
patient identifiers, and disease registries.” Lawton Robert Burns &
Ralph W. Muller, Hospital-Physician Collaboration: Landscape of
Economic Integration and Impact of Clinical Integration, 86 Milbank
Q. 375, 380–82 (2008).
Rather than promote clinical integration, most HCOs focused their
efforts on building the organization and promoting economic integration
through the alignment of physicians’ financial interests with the
organization’s goals. See Shortell et al., supra, at 129 (discussing
that health systems in the 1990s focused their attention and energy on
“putting the pieces of the system together, building a functional
infrastructure, and negotiating relationships with physicians”);
Stephen M. Shortell & Rodney K. McCurdy, Integrated Health Systems,
in Engineering the System of Healthcare Delivery 369, 371
(W.B. Rouse and D.A. Cortese eds. 2010) (“The failure of most
[integrated delivery systems] to provide greater value over the past 15
years has been due to their over-emphasis on achieving functional and
economic integration to the neglect of the clinical integration process.”);
Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1050 (stating that these new
organizations “failed to fulfill their potential because the main driver
was to create a structure rather than to develop objectives or the
desired outcome of integration”).

32.

See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that “in many risk-bearing
physician groups, utilization controls were inadequate or completely
nonexistent,” few or no clinical protocols or guidelines existed, and the
organizations merely managed payment).

33.

See id. (explaining that prior to the development of electronic health
records, organizations “had no way of tracking services costs for
patients” in a timely manner and that “[fe]w or no clinical protocols or
guidelines existed in most physician organizations to guide optimal
physician decision making”); Witt et al., supra note 17, at 13 (one
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physicians into their organization, with physicians often viewing
themselves as separate from the HCO and as having divergent
interests, values, and goals.34
While some HCOs realized their potential, for most the goals of
greater efficiencies and quality improvements proved elusive.35 As a
result, many HCOs experienced economic distress,36 with hospitals in
particular suffering significant financial losses.37 The late 1990s thus
brought a decline in these multi-provider partnerships, with many
HCOs disbanding and numerous hospitals dissolving their
arrangements with employed physicians.38
Even though these early partnerships saw many failures, a
convergence of factors has brought renewed interest in integration.39

reason for the financial losses suffered by hospitals that entered into
arrangements with physicians was the lack of access to timely data).
34.

See Sara A. Kreindler et al., Interpretations of Integration in Early
Accountable Care Organizations, 90 Milbank Q. 457, 458 (2012)
(stating that the push toward vertically integrated systems in the 1990s
“did not create the desired social-psychological change: Despite being
nominally part of the same organization, physicians and hospitals
continued to see themselves as separate groups with divergent interests,
values, and worldviews”); see also Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at
393 (discussing research from the 1990s which found that “membership
in PHOs and IPAs had little effect on physicians’ identification or
commitment” to integrated delivery networks).

35.

See Kreindler et al., supra note 34, at 459 (“While some integrated
systems have achieved exceptional performance, many others have
faltered . . . .”).

36.

See, e.g., Lawton R. Burns et al., History of Physician-Hospital
Collaboration: Obstacles and Opportunities, in Partners in Health:
How Physicians and Hospitals Can Be Accountable Together
18, 30 (Francis J. Crosson & Laura A. Tollen eds., 2010) (noting that
many integrated delivery systems suffered economic stress, including one
major bankruptcy); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 35 (“[N]umerous
physician groups incurred huge economic losses and went bankrupt.”).

37.

See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 16 (“[The] hospital excursion into
physician employment was an economic disaster.”).

38.

See id. (“Many hospitals aggressively divested physician practices in the
late 1990s and into the early 2000s.”); Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6,
at 8 (“When demand for managed care ebbed in the late 1990s, many of
these partnerships disbanded . . . .”); Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at
383 (“The number of these models peaked in 1996 and since then has
steadily declined . . . .”); Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1049
(“[H]ospitals began to divest themselves of their employed primary care
practices in an attempt to minimize further financial losses.”).

39.

See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 2 (noting that “[b]y early 2010,
integration was again on the upswing in response to” new payment
methodologies that require physicians and hospitals to better coordinate
care and align their financial incentives); Moore & Coddington, supra
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Most importantly, payors impatient with rising health care costs and
variable quality of care are again exploring alternatives to fee-forservice, such as tying payments to patient outcomes and overall
costs.40 In addition, the rising financial costs and administrative
burdens of operating an independent, private practice are pushing
many physicians out of private practice and into HCOs.
Although the renewed drive toward integration started with
changes in how private payors reimburse health care providers, health
care reform has accelerated this trend by fundamentally altering
Medicare’s payment policies. In particular, Medicare’s new Shared
Savings Program calls for providers to form integrated entities known
as accountable care organizations (ACOs), with an ACO’s providermembers held jointly accountable for the cost and quality of care
provided to the ACO’s patients.41 Medicare’s new bundled payments
program similarly incentivizes providers to work together. Providers
participating in the bundled payment program receive a single
payment for an episode of care that then is allocated among all
providers treating a patient. This in turn encourages a patient’s
providers to work together to avoid high costs that could exhaust the
fixed payment.42 The Affordable Care Act also shifts the Medicare
program away from its past practice of paying physicians and
hospitals solely based on the volume of services provided to patients,
without regard to the quality of care. For example, Medicare’s
note 25, at 47 (“A convergence of factors is creating a renewed interest
in integrated health care.”).
40.

See Jeroen Trybou et al., The Ties That Bind: An Integrative
Framework of Physician-Hospital Alignment, 11 BMC Health Servs.
Res. 3 (2011) (commenting that payors are implementing “a broad
array of public and private-sector initiatives” that hold providers
financially accountable for the cost of care and promote improved
quality of care).

41.

See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1410–12 (describing the ACO model and
Medicare’s Shared Savings Program). The Shared Savings Program has
generated tremendous activity in the health care sector, with many
physicians and hospitals forming, or contemplating forming, ACOs. See
Gary D. Ahlquist et al., Booz & Co., Accountable Care
Organizations: The New Player in the Health-Reform
Landscape 2 (2011) (noting the “swelling wave of ACO activity in the
U.S. healthcare market,” and reporting that “virtually every” major
private health insurer is either “involved in, planning, or seriously
considering ACOs,” and that seventy-four percent of hospital chief
executives state that “their organizations will be part of an ACO within
the next five years”).

42.

See Burns et al., supra note 36 (“Bundled payments likely require
providers to coordinate care . . . .”); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 38
(explaining that bundled payments are a form of insurance risk, as
poorly coordinated care can result in higher costs that exhaust the fixed
bundled payment, exposing the contracting group to losses).
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hospital
value-based
purchasing
program
ties
hospitals’
reimbursement rates to patient outcomes, a change that will require
hospitals to work more closely with their physicians in order to
improve the quality of hospital care.43 Future Medicare adjustments
to physician payments based on patient outcomes similarly will
encourage physicians to look for assistance in raising the quality of
care they provide to patients.44
Many in the health care industry believe that success under these
various payment reforms requires physicians to collaborate with one
another and with hospitals.45 As previously noted, HCOs are more
likely than independent physicians to achieve the efficiencies and
improved patient outcomes demanded by payors. Moreover, in
contrast to earlier HCOs, today’s HCOs are placing greater emphasis
on clinical integration as the key to achieving these objectives,46 a
trend supported by recent improvements in health information
technology.47 The HCOs of today thus offer greater opportunities for
43.

See Burns et al., supra note 36, at 38 (commenting that pay-forperformance models, or value-based purchasing, which “reward hospitals
for improvements, may [also] require physicians to collaborate”); Witt
et al., supra note 17, at 5 (stating that various payment methodologies
under health care reform “require increased collaboration and financial
integration between physicians and hospitals”). Another Medicare
payment program that ties payments to quality of care is the new
Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reductions Program, which reduces
payments to hospitals for certain avoidable readmissions. See Witt et
al., supra note 17, at 20 (discussing Medicare’s new hospital
readmission payment rules).

44.

See Jordan Rau, Medicare Speeds Up Pay Plan, WASH. POST, July 22,
2013, at A15 (quoting Kavita Patel and explaining that smaller
physician groups will have difficulty adjusting to Medicare’s value-based
program, while larger physician groups have figured out how to do so);
see generally Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 383 (describing how
pay-for-performance models that compensate physicians for care
improvements require physicians to collaborate with hospitals); Moore &
Coddington, supra note 25, at 53 (stating that being part of large,
integrated systems gives physicians the opportunity to practice higher
quality care than those in solo or small group practice).

45.

See Burns et al., supra note 36, at 37 (stating that new payment
methodologies “will require hospitals and physicians to work together”).

46.

See John H. Duffy, A Push For Clinical Integration, Trustee, July–
Aug. 2011, at 30, 30 (commenting that while in the past clinical
integration was rarely achieved, major organizations have recently made
investments to increase clinical integration); Keith D. Terry, Clinical
Integration Sets the Stage for Positive Change, Health Mgmt. Tech.,
Sept. 2012, at 16, 16 (“[M]any healthcare organizations are racing to
embrace clinical integration strategies.”).

47.

Advancements in health information technology support greater clinical
integration by allowing today’s HCOs to collect quality data, develop
clinical guidelines and protocols, implement quality improvement
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improved care at lower costs relative to earlier HCOs.48 In addition,
the assumption of financial risk for the aggregate cost of caring for a
group of patients “is a game of large numbers”—as providers must
spread this risk across a large patient population in order to protect
themselves from the possibility of a few patients requiring costly
care.49 Aligning with large organizations, therefore, is essential for any
physician assuming financial risk under these new payment models.50
Not surprising, then, physicians are showing a renewed interest in
participating in integrated delivery models.51
In addition to payment reforms, the changing economics of
private practice also is prompting physicians to join HCOs.52 Solo and
small group physicians face stagnant or declining reimbursement
rates,53 in part because they lack bargaining leverage with private
payors given their small size.54 Independent practices also face rising
overhead costs and administrative burdens.55 For example, by 2015,
initiatives, and enhance care coordination. See Mantel, supra note 2, at
1416; see also Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 20 (explaining the
benefits of electronic health records and how relative to the 1980s and
1990s providers can now use technology to measure quality).
48.

See Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 53 (noting that physicians
have concluded that affiliating with HCOs affords them “the
opportunity to practice higher quality, more cost-effective medicine than
[does a] solo practice or small [group]”).

49.

Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing that providers who assume
financial risk must ensure that the risk is spread over a large patient
population).

50.

See id. (explaining that aggregating large numbers of physicians “is an
essential precondition of organizing for risk”).

51.

See supra note 6 (reporting on the shift away from solo and small group
practices to HCOs).

52.

See Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 49 (identifying the
changing economics of private practice as a factor driving the
movement toward integration).

53.

See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that
reimbursement cuts, alongside other challenges, “have pushed
[physician] practices to the breaking point”); Burns & Muller, supra
note 31, at 391 (reporting that physicians’ reimbursement is declining);
Michael Zeis, Physician Alignment: Integration Over Independence,
HealthLeaders Media: Intelligence, Sept. 2012, at 1, 9 (stating
that independent physicians “worry about [their] declining
reimbursements”).

54.

See Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 656 (explaining that independent
physicians’ incomes have declined because they are disadvantaged in
contract negotiations).

55.

See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that physician practice
overhead costs have steadily risen in the past fifty years, rising at a rate
four times the rate of inflation).
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physicians must either incorporate into their practices meaningful use
of electronic health records or accept the penalty of lower
reimbursement rates under Medicare.56 Physicians also face increased
documentation and data-reporting requirements stemming from the
previously discussed payment reforms and Medicare’s various quality
reporting obligations.57 Meeting these requirements requires a
substantial investment in technology and staff, as well as the
physician’s time. Many solo and small group practices, however, lack
the capital or willingness to undertake these burdens.58
HCOs offer physicians an attractive alternative to the demands
and burdens of private practice. With their superior resources, HCOs
can provide the capital, technology, and staff needed to support
today’s practice of medicine, freeing physicians to focus their energies
on treating patients and allowing them to find a better work-life
balance.59 Consequently, physicians increasingly are willing to give up
the autonomy of independent practice in order to reap the benefits of
affiliating with an HCO.
While certainly not all physicians have moved in the direction of
joining HCOs, the trend is clear—the health care system is quickly
shifting away from one dominated by independent, private physicians
to various models of integration.60 These fundamental changes in the
56.

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(7)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

57.

See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that the quality movement
in health care and Medicare’s new payment reforms require physicians
and their staffs to document their case records, leading to increased
documentation time and supporting requirements).

58.

See Jackson Healthcare, A Tough Time for Physicians: 2012
Medical Practice & Attitude Report 5 (2012) (stating that
physicians leaving private practice cite the following reasons for their
doing so: declining reimbursement, capitation, and unprofitable practice;
business complexities and hassles; and overhead and high cost of doing
business); Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 656 (stating that the economic
stresses of independent practice “has led a growing number of physicians
to give up independent practice”).

59.

See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 3 (“As physicians increasingly
seek . . . shelter from the demands and declining economies of private
practice, the attractiveness of group practice or direct employment
grows.”); Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1051 (stating that
physicians are considering joining HCOs for greater economic security,
peace of mind, and better work-life balance).

60.

See Michelle Hogan, Come Together: In Environment of Increasing
Consolidation, Nephrologist Founds Independent Practice Association,
Nephrology Times, Feb. 2001, at 7, 8 (“While the options for
partnering with other medical providers come in all shapes and
sizes, . . . in this day and age, some level of collaboration is
unavoidable.”); Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 54 (“[M]ost care
providers appear headed in the same general direction (i.e., toward
greater integration and closer coordination) . . . .”).
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organization and delivery of health care raise important questions
regarding the impact of HCO organizational culture on physicians’
clinical decision making and, ultimately, on health care costs, quality,
and rationing.

II. Physician Decision Making
To understand the influence of HCO organizational culture on the
quality, modality, and cost of patient care, one must first understand
how physicians make clinical decisions. Ideally the practice of
medicine would involve a careful, systematic evaluation of a patient’s
symptoms and conditions, with science providing a clear pathway
toward diagnosis and treatment. The reality, though, often looks very
different. As aptly described by Dr. David Eddy, “Uncertainty, biases,
errors, and difference of opinions, motives, and values weaken every
link in the chain that connects a patient’s actual condition to the
selection of a diagnostic test or treatment.”61 The absence of clear
answers as to the correct diagnosis and course of treatment means
physicians instead must rely on their professional intuition.62 This
Part explains that these judgments are guided by physicians’
cognitive frameworks, or schemas, that organize their knowledge,
assumptions, and values. Part III then describes how an HCO’s
organizational culture may impact physicians’ schemas and,
ultimately, their clinical decisions.
A. Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Medicine

A physician-patient encounter begins with a patient presenting
various complaints, signs, or symptoms.63 On the basis of these initial
observations, the physician then must develop a diagnostic strategy
and select a course of therapeutic treatment.64 Because diagnostic
tests may expose patients to risk65 and involve time and expense,
61.

David M. Eddy, Variation in Physician Practice: The Role of
Uncertainty, 3 Health Aff. 74, 75 (1984).

62.

See Floyd et al., supra note 29, at 238 (“[T]he delivery of health care
relies significantly on the exercise of the physician’s expert professional
judgement [sic].”).

63.

See Eddy, supra note 61, at 75 (“[A] large part of medicine is practiced
on people who do not have obvious illnesses, but rather have signs,
symptoms, or findings that may or may not represent an illness that
should be treated.”).

64.

See Cheryl B. Travis et al., Judgment Heuristics and Medical Decisions,
13 Patient Educ. & Counseling 211, 212 (1989) (identifying the
three components of medical decision making as encompassing the
“recognition and reporting of signs and symptoms, diagnostic strategy,
and selection of treatment options”).

65.

See Thomas Schlich, Risk and Medical Innovation: A Historical
Perspective, in The Risks of Medical Innovation 1, 1 (Thomas
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physicians cannot order every conceivable test that may confirm or
rule out a diagnosis. Similarly, once they make a diagnosis, physicians
must select among available treatments. In choosing among
alternative diagnostic tests and treatment therapies, a physician’s
choice depends in part on her predictions—the probability a patient
has a particular condition, the probability that a diagnostic procedure
will yield useful information,66 the probability that a patient will
benefit from a therapeutic intervention, or the probability that a
procedure will lead to complications or death.67 Unfortunately,
physicians frequently lack the necessary information to make such
predictions.
A major source of uncertainty in medicine is the lack of
authoritative evidence and guidelines on the appropriate course of
treatment.68 Ideally, researchers would rigorously test the effectiveness
of available diagnostic tests and treatment therapies, yielding the
information clinicians need to make informed decisions regarding a
medical intervention’s utility and risks. Various obstacles, however,
prevent doing so.69 Consequently, the domain in which authoritative

Schlich & Ulrich Tröhler eds. 2006) (noting that diagnostic measures, as
well as therapeutic and preventive measures, expose patients to
potential harm “through anticipated and unanticipated negative
consequences”). For example, a CT scan of the brain exposes a patient
to a radiation dose that is the equivalent of 15–300 chest X-rays. See
When to Say ‘Whoa!’ to Your Doctor: Common Tests and Treatments
You Probably Don’t Need, Consumer Rep., June 2012, at 12, 13
(discussing the risks associated with common diagnostic tests).
66.

See Travis et al., supra note 64, at 213 (“Decisions to request diagnostic
tests or expert consultation . . . . are made on the basis of hypotheses
regarding a probable diagnosis.”).

67.

See generally Neal V. Dawson & Hal R. Arkes, Systematic Errors in
Medical Decision Making: Judgment Limitations, 2 J. Gen. Intern.
Med. 183, 183 (1987) (“Daily medical practice depends heavily on the
physician’s use of basic cognitive skills such as estimating probabilities
of future outcomes . . . .”).

68.

See Amitabh Chandra et al., Who Ordered That? The Economics of
Treatment Choices in Medical Care, in 2 Handbook of Health
Economics 397, 402 (Mark V. Pauly et al. eds., 2012) (“In many
clinical situations, there are no authoritative guidelines or consensus
treatment recommendations.”)

69.

First, rigorous evaluation of a medical intervention’s effectiveness often
is extremely expensive and sometimes raises serious ethical issues. See
Jan R. Blustein & Theodore Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules:
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1543,
1549 (1992) (describing some of the problems with clinical trials). In
addition, a comprehensive evaluation of a particular medical
intervention may require years of observation, leaving many new
technologies inadequately researched prior to their adoption by
clinicians. See Katherine H. Hall, Reviewing Intuitive Decision-Making

472

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
The Myth of the Independent Physician

evidence guides clinicians’ professional judgments is quite small, with
less than half of medical decisions supported by adequate evidence
regarding an intervention’s effectiveness.70 Lacking this information,
physicians frequently cannot judge an intervention’s probable
outcomes.71 The availability of dozens of procedures for diagnosing or
treating a condition only further complicates a physician’s task.72 The
practice of medicine thus fairly can be characterized as one where

and Uncertainty: The Implications for Medical Education, 36 Med.
Educ. 216, 216–17 (2002) (“Many new technologies have not been
adequately researched as to the best ways they can be utilised.”).
Equally troubling, few studies track a treatment’s long-term impact on a
patient’s health. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New
Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the
Genomic Era, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 419, 44647 (2010) (noting
that few clinical trials are of sufficient duration to allow for the
detection of an intervention’s long-term effects on health). Moreover,
when evidence of effectiveness does exist, sometimes studies point in
different directions, with clinicians facing the challenge of sorting
through conflicting or inconsistent results. See Eddy, supra note 61, at
81 (explaining that clinicians are frequently left with a mixture of
evidence, and that “evidence from different sources can easily go in
different directions, [making it] virtually impossible for anyone to sort
things out in his or her head”). Finally, even where clinical trials
establish the benefits of a particular medical intervention, questions
often remain regarding its utility relative to other options. See
Clement J. McDonald, Medical Heuristics: The Silent Adjudicators of
Clinical Practice, 124 Ann. Intern. Med. 56, 56 (1996) (discussing
open issues regarding drug therapies); see also C. David Naylor, Grey
Zones of Clinical Practice: Some Limits to Evidence-Based Medicine,
345 Lancet 840, 840 (1995) (noting the incomplete or contradictory
information about the benefits of competing clinical options).
70.

See Cong. Budget Office, Research on the Comparative
Effectiveness of Medical Treatments: Issues and Options or
an Expanded Federal Role 9 (2007); see also Brenda Sirovich et al.,
Discretionary Decision Making by Primary Care Physicians and the
Cost of U.S. Health Care, 27 Health Aff. 813, 814 (2008) (discussing
a review by BMJ’s Clinical Evidence finding that more than half of
treatments for a variety of conditions fall into the gray zone of
medicine).

71.

See Dawson & Arkes, supra note 67, at 183 (stating that daily medical
practice depends heavily on physicians estimating probabilities of future
outcomes, a task severely compromised by gaps in clinical evidence).

72.

See Eddy, supra note 61, at 78 (explaining that the task of selecting a
procedure is complicated by the fact that “there are dozens of
procedures that can be ordered, in any combination, at any time”);
Naylor, supra note 69, at 840 (“Another difficulty arises from the
Malthusian growth of uncertainty when multiple technologies are
combined into clinical strategies.”).
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clinicians regularly confront ambiguous choices regarding how best to
manage their patients’ care.73
A second source of uncertainty in medicine stems from variation
among patients. Even when clinicians possess information on a
treatment’s overall clinical effectiveness, the information only reveals
average benefits and risks. Statistical projections based on large
population averages, however, may hide significant variation among
patients, as disparity in patient conditions and characteristics can
cause a given intervention to affect patients differently.74 In addition,
many clinical studies limit participation to only those patients
meeting certain characteristics,75 raising questions about the
generalizability of a study’s findings to those patient populations
excluded from the study.76 As a result, a procedure or treatment’s
potential clinical benefits and risks for an individual patient often
remain uncertain.77
73.

See Robert Town et al., Assessing the Influence of Incentives on Physicians
and Medical Groups, 61 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 80S, 91S (Supp. 2004)
(“[P]hysicians are commonly confronted with ambiguous choices and
feedback about both the illness and the treatment modality.”).

74.

See Henry J. Aaron, Waste, We Know You Are Out There, 359 New
Eng. J. Med. 1865, 1866 (2008) (“A given intervention typically affects
individual patients differently.”); Mantel, supra note 2, at 1420
(discussing the limitations of clinical evidence given the variation in how
a medical intervention affects particular patients).

75.

For example, an analysis of acute myocardial infarction medications
found that the majority of studies excluded persons over a certain age.
See Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., The Exclusion of the Elderly and Women
from Clinical Trials in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 268 JAMA 1417,
1417–20 (1992) (finding that a majority of studies—over sixty percent—
had age-based subject exclusions—some as low as age sixty-five—with
the presence of age exclusions increasing over time). Clinical studies
frequently exclude patients on the basis of age and other factors out of
concern that these patients’ higher prevalence of comorbid conditions
will increase the risk of side effects or other complications, resulting in
poor outcomes not attributable to the studied medical intervention. This
in turn could result in data that show a dilution of the beneficial effect
of the drug studied, or raise the cost of a study by requiring a larger
number of subjects. See id. at 1420–21 (discussing the reasons for
excluding the elderly from clinical drug studies); McDonald, supra note
69, at 56 (noting that rarely are scientific studies large enough to
determine how variation in patient factors may alter the benefits or
risks of a therapy).

76.

See Gurwitz et al., supra note 75, at 1420 (explaining that the exclusion
of elderly patients from clinical trials of drugs used to treat acute
myocardial infarction severely limits the ability to generalize study
findings to elderly patients).

77.

See id. at 1421 (“[A] priori exclusion of the elderly [from clinical drug
trials] prevents collection of the very data clinicians and researchers
need to make informed decisions when treating this important
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Ambiguity in medical decision making also stems from the
inherent value choices in health care. Medical procedures frequently
involve trade-offs between potential health benefits and risks. A
medical intervention may yield useful diagnostic information, cure or
ameliorate a disease, or increase a patient’s life expectancy, but it also
may expose a patient to pain, anxiety, or risks such as complications
or death.78 In addition, concerns about the rising cost of health care
raise the additional question of whether a particular treatment
represents a worthwhile use of society’s health care resources.79 All
medical decisions, then, involve making trade-offs “[a]nd making
tradeoffs involves values.”80
Science cannot identify how best to balance the competing value
choices underlying various medical decisions. Physicians instead must
be guided by their own personal values (and those of their patients)
when deciding the appropriate course of treatment. And because
physicians vary as to how they value different outcomes, physicians
make different trade-offs.81 For example, a physician who believes it is
important to pursue every possible chance for survival, no matter how
population.”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in
Health Care Costs: Is There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the
Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 15 (“Given the infinite variability of
patients and conditions, it is often quite difficult to know with any
precision how useful any test or procedure will be ex ante.”); Mantel,
supra note 2, at 1420 (“[A] treatment’s potential clinical benefits for an
individual patient often remain uncertain, with some care that, on
average, is of no, or merely marginal, benefit potentially benefitting
some patients.”).
78.

See Eddy, supra note 61, at 82 (“The basic problem is that any procedure
has multiple outcomes, some good and some bad.”); Peter Juhn et al.,
Balancing Modern Medical Benefits and Risks, 26 Health Aff. 647, 647
(2007) (“Therapeutic interventions can stop or slow the progression of
serious diseases, prevent illnesses, or improve the quality of life for a
patient . . . . [But] they can also present distinct and, at times, serious
health risks.”). For example, chemotherapy may allow a patient to live
longer, but it may decrease the patient’s quality of life. See Sidney T.
Bogardus et al., Perils, Pitfalls, and Possibilities in Talking About Medical
Risk, 281 JAMA 1037, 1038 (1999) (“[C]hemotherapy might allow a
person to live longer with an otherwise incurable cancer. This added life
expectancy might be a benefit to some people but for others, the extra
time spent in discomfort would be a risk.”).

79.

See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits:
Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 26
(1997) (noting that medical decision making involves value choices,
including “decisions about how much money is appropriate to spend” in
an effort to achieve health-related goals).

80.

Eddy, supra note 61, at 82.

81.

See generally id. (noting variation in how people value a medical
procedure’s different outcomes).
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remote, may recommend that a patient undergo an unproven,
experimental cancer therapy. In contrast, those placing higher value
on competing concerns, such as patient comfort or efficient use of
health care resources, may advise against such treatment.82
A final source of uncertainty in clinical decision making arises
from the complexity and breadth of information physicians must sort
through in arriving at a diagnosis and plan of treatment. As explained
by one commentator, “The final decision about how to manage a
patient requires synthesizing all of the information about a disease,
the patient, signs and symptoms, the effectiveness of dozens of tests
and treatments; outcomes, and values.”83 Unfortunately, physicians
rarely have the luxury of engaging in a comprehensive evaluation of a
clinical problem.84 Rather than investigate all competing hypotheses
generated by a patient’s symptoms, they instead focus on a limited
set of possible diagnoses.85 Similarly, rather than conduct an
exhaustive review of all the clinical evidence, physicians may settle on
a diagnosis when they conclude there is “enough evidence to bring
closure to the diagnostic process.”86 This lack of deep clinical analysis
further introduces uncertainty into medical decision making, as
physicians often make decisions based on an imprecise and incomplete
assessment of the clinical problem.87
The lack of scientific information on the optimal approach to
diagnosis and treatment, the need to make difficult value trade-offs,
and the challenges of processing complex and conflicting information

82.

See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 79, at 18–19 (discussing the value tradeoffs of ABMT for treating breast cancer).

83.

Eddy, supra note 61, at 83.

84.

See Hall, supra note 18, at 480 (noting that doctors often do not incorporate
careful, systematic evaluations into their clinical decision making).

85.

See Bernard Charlin et al., Scripts and Medical Diagnostic Knowledge:
Theory and Applications for Clinical Reasoning Instruction and
Research, 75 Acad. Med. 182, 184 (2000) (stating that physicians
consider the set of hypotheses representing the initial possibility he or
she feels need to be pursued); see also David M. Eddy & Charles H.
Clanton, The Art of Diagnosis: Solving the Clinicopathological Exercise,
306 New Eng. J. Med. 1263, 1266 (1982) (explaining that if a
physician believes a diagnosis is more likely than another possible
diagnosis, the later may be dropped from further consideration).

86.

Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 185; see also Jerome P. Kassirer,
Sounding Board: Our Stubborn Quest for Diagnostic Certainty,
320 New Eng. J. Med. 1489, 1489 (1989) (stating that the physician’s
task “is not to attain certainty, but rather to reduce the level of
diagnostic uncertainty enough to make optimal therapeutic decisions”).

87.

See Kassirer, supra note 86, at 1489 (“Absolute certainty in diagnosis is
unattainable, no matter how much information [physicians] gather, how
many observations we make, or how many tests we perform.”).
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means physicians regularly confront uncertain and ambiguous
choices.88 Yet they must make clinical decisions despite lacking clear
answers. As described in Part II.B, the manner in which a physician
responds to this uncertainty and ambiguity is largely a function of
intuitive expertise that shapes how she construes a clinical matter and
the decision rules she applies.89
B. The Role of Cognitive Schemas in Clinical Decision Making

The field of cognitive psychology has shown that our judgments
and decisions rarely result from conscious, deductive reasoning based
on a systematic approach to the evidence.90 Our mental processing
instead reflects the application of cognitive frameworks, or schemas,
that organize our knowledge and beliefs about a situation.91 In the
health care context, schemas provide the “personal decision rules”
that physicians use to make clinical decisions, particularly in
conditions of uncertainty.92

88.

See Town et al., supra note 73, at 91S (stating that ambiguities are an
inevitable part of patient management, especially as “[t]here is often a
lack of scientific information about the optimal approach to the
diagnosis and treatment of many diseases, and physicians are commonly
confronted with ambiguous choices and feedback about both the illness
and the treatment modality”).

89.

See Hall, supra note 69, at 216 (“It is known that intuitive expertise
requires a well organised store of networks and rules which allow
efficient access and retrieval of information. These ‘personal decision
rules’ are used by clinicians, particularly in conditions of
uncertainty . . . .”); Town et al., supra note 73, at 91S (“A physician’s
response to ambiguity will be a function of how he or she construes a
situation and the rules available to respond to the situation.”).

90.

See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (2011)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of how cognitive processing is
primarily influenced by automatic, subconscious thought rather than
conscious reasoning).

91.

See James L. Bowditch, Anthony F. Buono & Marcus M.
Stewart, A Primer on Organizational Behavior, 45 (7th ed.
2008) (“People often use schemas, cognitive frameworks that
systematize our ‘knowledge’ about . . . other people, situations, objects,
and . . . phenomena.”); Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital
Doctors and Their Schemas About Appropriate Prescribing, 39 Med.
Educ. 184, 185 (2005) (defining schemas as “ordered patterns of mental
representations that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding specific
objects, concepts or events”).

92.

Hall, supra note 69, at 216 (stating that schemas are “personal decision
rules” used by physicians, particularly in conditions of uncertainty).
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1.

Cognitive Schemas

Schemas are the mental processes triggered by a particular
situation.93 Derived from our past experiences, societal roles, and
personal morals,94 schemas organize the rules, assumptions, and values
we apply to a given situation.95 In doing so, they provide cognitive
shortcuts that operate outside of conscious awareness,96 eliminating
the need for careful, systematic reasoning.97 Schemas thus can be
understood as the intuitions that shape our judgments and actions.
In organizing our knowledge and values in a systematic way,
schemas help us navigate a situation. First, schemas guide the search
for, acquisition of, and processing of information. Schemas dictate
what information an individual retrieves from memory98 and direct
which elements of a situation are attended to and which are ignored.99

93.

See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity
of Being, 54 Am. Psychologist 462, 462 (1999) (explaining that
individuals’ mental processes are put into motion by features of the
situation facing the individual); Linda K. Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics
in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. Mgmt. 951, 961 (2006) (stating that a
situation triggers a script—a type of schema—that shapes the individual’s
formation of judgment and intention to act).

94.

See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 45 (“[S]chemas
can reflect ourselves, . . . the roles we play, and events we experience.”);
Stanley G. Harris, Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking:
A Schema-Based Perspective, 5 Org. Sci. 309, 310 (1994) (stating that
schemas are “from one’s experiences about how the world operates”).

95.

See Higgins & Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (defining schemas).

96.

See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 93, at 462 (1999) (“[M]ost of a
person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions
and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion
by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious
awareness and guidance.”); Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in
Organizational Behavior, 9 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 449, 450, 454 (1984)
(stating that schemas “have been shown to be basic elements of
cognitive processing,” and that people are “not purely rational
information processors”).

97.

See Hall, supra note 18, at 480 (explaining that heuristics, a type of
schema, are “decisionmaking shortcuts [that] eliminate the need to
reason from first principles and elemental facts in every case”); Hall,
supra note 69, at 216 (describing intuition—or schemas—as “cognitive
‘short-circuiting’”).

98.

See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 183 (“[T]o give meaning to a new
situation in our environment, we use prior knowledge that contains
information about the characteristics and features of the
situation . . . .”); Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (identifying one function
of schemas as “direct[ing] information . . . retrieval from memory”).

99.

See Higgins & Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (“A schema can be viewed as
a coded expectation about any aspect of an individual’s life, which
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In addition, schemas help make sense of these elements by describing
the relationships between them100 and by shaping an individual’s
expectations about the situation.101 Schemas thus guide the knowledge
an individual applies to a situation, as well as her perception and
analysis of people and events.102
Second, schemas guide an individual’s behavioral response to a
situation. When a situation calls for action, a type of schema known
as a script is triggered.103 As the term suggests, scripts facilitate action
by incorporating knowledge of event sequences and specifying
appropriate behavior.104 They therefore play an essential role in
translating thought into action, influencing goal setting, planning, and
execution.105
Schemas thus reduce the cognitive complexity of decision making
by providing simplified representations of people, events, or situations
and by formulating action in the face of uncertainty.106 In essence,
dictates which characteristics of a given event are attended to, which
are stored for the future, and which are rejected as irrelevant.”).
100. See Kimberly D. Elsbach et al., Identifying Situated Cognition in
Organizations, 16 ORG. SCI. 422, 422 (2005) (“Schemas both constitute
and structure knowledge by identifying those elements of a situation
that are salient, and by describing the causal relations between them.”).
101. See Peter P. Poole et al., Organizational Script Development Through
Interactive Accommodation, 15 Group & Org. Stud. 212, 213 (1990)
(explaining that schemas “can be viewed as cognitive models that
provide structured expectations about people, situations, and events”);
Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 183 (stating that schemas, such as
scripts, contain “information about the relationships that link [a
situation’s] characteristics and features”).
102. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “guide
perception, memory, and inference”); Poole et al., supra note 101, at 213
(explaining that the selected schema governs “the interpretation an
individual gives to a situation”).
103. See Poole et al., supra note 101, at 213 (“When behavior or action is a
concern, a type of schema known as a script is called into play.”).
104. See Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 449 (“A script is a schematic
knowledge structure held in memory that specifies behavior or event
sequences that are appropriate for specific situations.”); Poole et al.,
supra note 101, at 213–14 (explaining that scripts “aid[ ] in
comprehension, coordination, and task accomplishment” by reflecting
“knowledge of behavior, action, and event sequences”).
105. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “facilitate
anticipations of the future, goal setting, planning and goal execution”).
106. See Elsbach et al., supra note 100, at 422 (“[Schemas] serve as simplified
representations of knowledge, and, as such, as a means for simplifying
cognition . . . .”); see also Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 454 (stating
that schemas such as scripts “are heuristic knowledge structures that aid
in reducing the cognitive complexity of decision making”); Higgins &
Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (“Schema theorists argue that each
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schemas serve as mental maps that enable individuals to quickly
orient themselves to and navigate a situation.107 In doing so, they
promote more efficient decision making by reducing the need to
devote intensive thought and logic to each and every situation.108
Schemas are especially important in facilitating decision making in
conditions of uncertainty because they fill gaps in the available
information and provide a template for action.109 Not surprisingly,
then, the schemas utilized by health professions significantly impact
their clinical decisions, particularly when the medical science provides
no clear answer.
2.

Physicians’ Use of Cognitive Schemas

When confronted with uncertainty and ambiguous clinical choices,
a physician’s response is a function of her personal cognitive
schemas.110 Beginning with the diagnostic process, schemas allow a
clinician to efficiently perceive the relevant elements of the patient’s
situation, generate hypotheses as to the causes of the patient’s
complaints, and strategically gather additional data for making a
diagnosis.111 Prior to ordering diagnostic tests or initiating therapeutic
treatments, physicians first must have “a rough idea about what is
occurring.”112 This begins with schemas focusing the physician’s
attention on certain attributes of the patient’s situation—specific
patient symptoms, details from the patient’s medical history, and
individual constructs a system of schemas and subschemas that are
connected in a way that enables that individual to deal effectively with
their world.”).
107. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (“Schemas serve as mental maps which
enable individuals to traverse and orient themselves within their
experiential terrain.”).
108. See Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 453 (explaining that schemas such
as scripts reduce the need to devote “equally intensive thought to all
actions,” with some situations requiring “little or no conscious
processing”); Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (schemas are “used by
individuals to encode and represent incoming information efficiently”).
109. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “guide filling
gaps in the information available” and “provide templates for problem
solving”); see also Elsbach et al., supra note 100, at 422 (stating that, in
providing representations of knowledge, schemas “[simplify] cognition in
conditions of incomplete information”).
110. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1019 (“[U]ncertain clinical situations will
force physicians to rely on judgment, habit, and personal practice style
in deciding how to treat patients.”).
111. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 186 (explaining that scripts provide
“a mental model of the situation, which allows the clinician to efficiently
generate hypotheses and strategically gather data”).
112. Id. at 183.
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features of the patient’s environment.113 In doing so, the clinician
quickly develops a representation of the situation that in turn
“activates networks of knowledge,” or schemas, that both describe the
possible relationship between key observations and generate
hypotheses regarding the patient’s condition.114 Schemas also direct
the course of action a physician takes to validate a hypothesis, such
as what further inquiries to make of the patient or which diagnostic
tests to order.115
Schemas also help the clinician navigate the clinical uncertainty
that surrounds the diagnostic process. Ideally, a particular diagnosis
will explain all of a patient’s symptoms and signs. In practice,
however, a patient’s symptoms and signs often do not perfectly match
the hypothesized diagnosis.116 The physician then must decide whether
clinical observations that cannot be explained by a diagnosis are
simply atypical features or discordant facts requiring consideration of
alternative hypotheses.117 A physician’s cognitive schemas guide this
evaluation.118 Similarly, because physicians cannot order every

113. See id. at 182–83 (describing how a physician’s scripts “give meaning to
a new situation” and “direct[ ] the selection . . . of information”); see
also Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1265 (explaining that physicians
apply heuristic devices that lead them to focus on certain findings,
temporarily ignoring other findings).
114. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 184 (explaining that physicians
quickly build “a representation of the situation that initiates the
direction and scope of the reasoning process;” that “within moments
hypotheses pop into the physician’s mind as possible explanations for
the patient’s problem;” that these hypotheses, “which are usually a
product of the clinician’s past experiences and knowledge, appear
quickly; and that their activation is an ‘unconscious act of memory
association’”); see also Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1265 (stating
that the application of a heuristic device leads the physician to focus on
a limited number of findings, or pivots, which then generate a realm of
possible diagnoses).
115. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 182–85 (describing the application
of scripts to the diagnostic process).
116. See id. at 186 (“[P]atient clinical features never perfectly match the
attributes of an illness scripts [sic] . . . .”).
117. See Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1266 (explaining that a
preliminary clinical diagnosis may not explain some findings and quoting
a discussant’s comment that prior to accepting the diagnosis, the
physician must ask whether there are “atypical features or discordant
facts” and determine whether other diagnoses should be considered).
118. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 186 (explaining that “scripts work
in such a way that a physician makes a ‘reasoned decision’ about why
some expectations are violated” and that, in script processing for
assessment of a fit, physicians must determine whether there are
reasonable explanations for these departures).
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conceivable test that may confirm or rule out a diagnosis,119 they must
determine when they have sufficient evidence to support a working
diagnosis and when to seek additional confirming evidence or explore
alternative hypotheses. Schemas again guide this determination.120
In addition to directing the diagnostic process, schemas also guide
a physician’s choice and implementation of a patient’s treatment plan.
As previously noted, schemas reflect a physician’s knowledge about a
disease and thus shape a physician’s predictions about a patient’s
prognosis or the efficacy of various therapeutic interventions.121
Importantly, schemas reflect the scientific assumptions given primacy
by a physician, which in turn impact her patient management
decisions.
To illustrate the influence of a physician’s underlying assumptions
on her professional judgment, consider the treatment of patients who
exhibit only mild or even no symptoms of their disease. When
patients with a disease exhibit no or mild symptoms, there may be
uncertainty as to whether to treat the disease with aggressive medical
interventions, such as surgery, or instead pursue a strategy of
“watchful waiting.”122 If the physician recommends surgery or other
risky procedures, she may do so on the assumption that the patient’s
condition will worsen over time, and thus the patient will require the

119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 185 (discussing the impact
of scripts on the diagnostic process and the fact that physicians often
base their diagnoses on less-than-complete evidence, “assum[ing] that
other values[—that is, other signs, symptoms, or attributes associated
with a condition—]are present [without] specifically check[ing] them”).
121. See id. at 183 (after arriving at a diagnosis, a clinician “can use related
knowledge to take actions, such as providing a prognosis . . . or
instituting a treatment”).
122. See, e.g., Raphael Rosenhek, Watchful Waiting for Severe Mitral
Regurgitation, 23 Seminars Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgery
203, 206 (2011) (“There is an ongoing debate as to whether
asymptomatic patients with severe mitral regurgitation should be
operated [on] in the absence of symptoms.”); A.R. Brady et al., LongTerm Outcomes of Immediate Repair Compared with Surveillance of
Small Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 1445
(2002) (finding “no long-term difference in mean survival between earlysurgery and surveillance groups”); see also Study: Watchful Waiting,
Not Surgery, Sometimes Best for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms, Heart
Disease Wkly., June 23, 2002, at 13, available at http://www.newsrx.c
om/newsletters/Heart-Disease-Weekly/2002-06-23/20020623333142W.html
(quoting a researcher from the 2002 New England Journal of Medicine as
stating, “There has been uncertainty in the medical community about
which patients with abdominal aortic aneurysms are likely to benefit
from elective surgery.”).
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procedure eventually.123 The physician also may assume that a laterperformed procedure would prove more risky due to factors such as
the patient’s increased age or advancement of the disease.124 In
contrast, physicians favoring watchful waiting may believe that
patients should not be exposed to the risks associated with a
procedure unless absolutely necessary125 or that the passage of time
may bring technological breakthroughs that reduce the procedure’s
risks or increase the chance of a favorable outcome.126
Differences in physicians’ underlying beliefs may also account for
variation in physicians’ drug-prescribing practices. For example,
physicians favoring newer drugs over older drugs may assume that
newer is usually better.127 Other physicians, however, may follow the
rule “never use a new drug when an old drug will do” because they
believe new drugs may pose unknown dangers to patients.128 As these
examples illustrate, variation in physicians’ practices often can be
attributed to differences in the assumptions incorporated into
physicians’ schemas.
Schemas also impact how physicians resolve the ambiguity arising
from the value trade-offs inherent in most medical decisions. A
physician’s schema guides the physician toward specific clinical
alternatives by elevating certain values while minimizing others. For
example, a schema may lead a physician to focus on whether a
treatment will extend a patient’s life, ignoring or minimizing other
concerns such as pain and disability, risks of health complications,
and financial costs.129 Similarly, physicians’ reliance on simplifying

123. See McDonald, supra note 69, at 60 (discussing the assumptions
underpinning arguments for elective surgery).
124. See id; see also Alice Goodman, Follicular Lymphoma: Is Watchful
Waiting Still a Treatment Option in Era of New and Improved
Therapy?, Oncology News Int’l, Mar. 2010, at 20, 20. (stating that
“one argument for starting therapy immediately [for the treatment of
follicular lymphoma is the concern] “that delaying therapy will lead to
problems such as irreversible organ damage, resistant disease,
transformation, and less robust response to delayed therapy”).
125. See id. (stating that an advantage of waiting before initiating certain
therapies may “include delaying acute and late adverse effects of
therapy”).
126. See McDonald, supra note 69, at 61 (discussing considerations on the
side of watchful waiting rather than recommending elective surgery).
127. See id. at 59 (discussing the reasons that new drugs often quickly
become the preferred drugs in their class).
128. See id. at 59–60 (highlighting the concerns justifying the rule “never use
a new drug when an old drug will do”).
129. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 82 (discussing value trade-offs in medical
decision making).
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maxims, known as heuristics,130 directs them toward choices that
promote certain values over others.131 As Dr. Eddy explains:
Anyone uncomfortable dealing with probabilities can use the
heuristic, “If there is any chance of (the disease), the
(procedure) should be performed.” If one cannot estimate the
number of people to be saved, one can use the heuristic, “If but
one patient is saved, the effort is worthwhile.” If one cannot
contemplate alternative uses of resources that might deliver a
greater benefit to a population, there is the heuristic, “Costs
should not be considered in decisions about individual
patients.”132

Schemas accordingly play a central role in the balance physicians
strike among the competing considerations arising in the patient-care
setting.
As the preceding discussion shows, schemas guide physicians’
professional judgments, enabling them to make choices in the face of
uncertainty and ambiguity. In the absence of clear clinical guidelines,
patient-care decisions are largely determined by the schemas directing
a physician’s cognitive processing. For this reason, it is of
fundamental importance that we understand the influences shaping
physicians’ schemas. Part III explores one such influence—an HCO’s
organizational culture.

III. The Impact of Organizational Culture on
Physicians’ Clinical Decision Making
As discussed in Part II, physicians’ clinical decisions are guided
by their cognitive schemas, which reflect a physician’s values and
beliefs. Because physicians generally are afforded significant autonomy
when making clinical decisions,133 it may be that their schemas are
shaped largely by their training and the norms of the medical
professional generally.134 The insights of organizational sociologists,
130. Heuristics are rules or guidelines that are applied for the purpose of
simplifying complex tasks and decisions. See Hall, supra note 69, at 219
(defining heuristics).
131. See Travis et al., supra note 64, at 212 (stating that “heuristics . . .
influence . . . preferences among alternatives” and impact “selection of
treatment options”).
132. Eddy, supra note 61, at 85; see also Hall, supra note 69, at 219 (describing
similar medical mottos that simplify physicians’ decision making).
133. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 87S (noting that “physicians practice
with much autonomy”); Floyd et al., supra note 29, at 239 (noting that
the complexity of medicine and its reliance on professional intuition
“requires clinical autonomy”).
134. Health professionals’ education and training involve a rigorous
socialization process, with clinicians generally internalizing the dominant
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however, teach us that people do not make decisions in a vacuum but
are influenced by situational variables, including organizational
culture.135
An organization’s culture manifests itself both formally and
informally. At the more visible level are an organization’s formal
structures, processes, and espoused values.136 These include the
organization’s financial-incentive structures, methods of performance
assessment, mission statement, and ethical guidelines.137 Of greater
influence, however, is an organization’s informal culture, that is, the
“taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings.”138
Together, an organization’s formal and informal culture significantly
influence its employees’ decisions, perhaps even more than the
professional norms and personal values an employee brings to the
workplace.139
Applying organizational theories to health care leads to the
conclusion that physicians embedded within HCOs are part of an
organizational dynamic that powerfully influences the physicians’
clinical judgments.140 Specifically, HCOs’ organizational cultures
beliefs and norms of their profession. See Town et al., supra note 73, at
85S (“Medical education includes one of the most intense socialization
processes of any profession, and the products of these programs bring
strong professional values to the practice setting.”).
135. See generally Lynne L. Dallas, Corporate Ethics in the Health Care
Marketplace, 3 Seattle J. for Soc. Jus. 213, 215 (2004) (explaining
that “most people’s behavior is affected by situational variables”).
136. See Edgar H. Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide
21–27 (new & rev. ed. 2009) (describing the three levels of
organizational culture).
137. See id. at 39–40 exhib.3.1; see also Bowditch, Buono & Stewart,
supra note 91, at 327, 329 (explaining that a firm’s shared values
include “guidelines as to acceptable behaviors” and “formal statements
of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters”); Huw T. O. Davies,
et al., Organisational Culture and Quality of Health Care, 9 Quality in
Health Care 111, 114 (2000) (stating culture artifacts of the medical
profession include methods of performance assessment).
138. See Schein, supra note 136, 21 fig.2.1 (defining an organization’s
informal culture as its underlying assumptions); see also Davies, supra
note 137 (explaining that assumptions “are the basic ‘taken for granted’
views of the world and how one can understand and intervene in it”).
139. See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 4 (“As studies have
found, a company’s culture and values often have a greater influence on
work-related decisions than the personal values of its employees.”).
140. See Timothy J. Hoff, The Physician as Worker: What It Means and
Why Now?, Health Care Mgmt. Rev., Fall 2001, at 53, 63 (noting
that when physicians come to practice alongside others, we might expect
them “to cultivate new mental models within which physicians enact
their clinical roles”); cf. Henry J. Silverman, Organization Ethics in the
Healthcare Organization: Proactively Managing the Ethical Climate to
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profoundly influence both how physicians perceive patients’ situations
and the thought patterns, attitudes, and values physicians apply
when making clinical decisions.
Although the empirical research on this issue is limited, several
studies suggest that physicians conform to the norms of the
organizations where they practice. For example, studies have found
that for physicians who admit patients to two or more hospitals, their
patients’ stays in a particular hospital are similar in length when
compared to the usual practice at that hospital.141 In other words, a
physician adapts her practices to the norm of the hospital where the
patient is admitted, admitting her patients for longer periods of time
in the hospital with the longer average length of stay and discharging
her patients sooner from the hospital with the shorter average length
of stay, even after controlling for differences in patient characteristics.
Such studies support the hypothesis that the organizational setting
has a significant impact on physicians’ cognitive schemas; otherwise,
one would expect a physician to have a consistent practice style
across hospital settings.142
This Part sets forth a theory for how an HCO’s organizational
culture shapes its affiliated physicians’ cognitive schemas and,
ultimately, their clinical decisions. Although various structural aspects
of an HCO impact physician’s patient-care decisions,143 this Article
Ensure Organizational Integrity, 12 HEC F. 202, 204–05 (2000)
(arguing that because of the influence of the contextual aspects of
healthcare institutions on physicians’ behavior, the “moral dimensions of
patient care need to be conceptualized as being largely influenced by
organizational dynamics”).
141. See Judith D. de Jong et al., Variation in Hospital Length of Stay: Do
Physicians Adapt Their Length of Stay Decisions to What is Usual in
the Hospital Where They Work?, 41 Health Servs. Res. 374 (2006)
(comparing lengths of stay for U.S. physicians admitting patients to two
or more hospitals); Gert P. Westert et al., Variation in Duration of
Hospital Stay Between Hospitals and Between Doctors Within Hospitals,
37 SOC. SCI. MED. 833 (1993) (similar study looking at Dutch
physicians).
142. See de Jong et al., supra note 141, at 388 (arguing that their findings of
variation in lengths of stay across hospitals for the same physician
support the hypothesis that organizational circumstances have a
profound influence on clinical decisions).
143. Organizational structural aspects that may impact or constrain
physicians’ patient-care decisions include the availability of resources
and specialists, the extent to which providers make use of health
information technology, and work flow processes. For example, a limited
supply of hospitals beds may lead physicians to treat patients outside
the hospital setting, while limited access to specialists may lead primary
care physicians to treat patients themselves rather than refer patients to
specialists for more intensive, technology-driven treatments. See
generally Mary Rorty, Introduction to Organization Issues in Clinical
Ethics, in Developing Organization Ethics in Healthcare: A
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focuses on the beliefs, norms, and values as reflected in an HCO’s
organizational culture. Part III.A discusses the influence exerted by a
physician’s organizational peers, particularly in conditions of
uncertainty. Part III.B then explains how a physician’s organizational
identification with an HCO may lead her to incorporate the HCO’s
norms, values, and goals into her schemas. Finally, Part III.C draws
on the theory of motivated cognition to explain how a physician’s selfinterest, as affected by the HCO, subconsciously biases her clinical
judgments.
A. The Influence of Organizational Peers

Research shows that within the group setting, leaders, role
models, and other peers exert strong influence over individuals’
norms, values, attitudes, and behavior.144 This process generally occurs
unconsciously, with individuals largely unaware of the impact of their
peers on their thinking.145 Physicians are no different, with
commentators long observing the sway physicians hold over one
another.146 For physicians affiliated with HCOs, then, their clinical
Case-Based Approach to Policy, Practice, and Compliance 49,
51 (Ann E. Mills et al. eds., 2001) (stating that physicians “ma[k]e
accommodations for organizational strictures” such as “the range of
available . . . treatments” and “restrictions on access to specialists”).
144. See Michael W. Grojean et al., Leaders, Values, and Organizational
Climate: Examining Leadership Strategies for Establishing an
Organizational Climate Regarding Ethics, 55 J. Bus. Ethics 223, 224
(2004) (explaining how organizational leaders influence other
organizational members’ perceptions and norms); Lynne L. Dallas, A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of
Enron’s Demise, 35 Rutgers L. J. 1, 21 22 (2003) (commenting that
the beliefs and values of others within an organization are often better
predictors of an individual’s behavior than the beliefs the individual
brought to the organization).
145. See Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think 13 (1986) (“The
individual within the collective is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the
prevailing thought style which almost always exerts an absolutely
compulsive force upon his thinking . . . .” (quoting Ludwik Fleck,
Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 41 (Thaddeus J.
Trenn & Robert K. Merton eds., Fred Bradley & Thaddeus J. Trenn
trans., University of Chicago Press 1979) (1935)); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 941,
959 (2007) (stating that the process of looking to peers, especially in
situations of ambiguity, is a “process of unconscious influence”).
146. See, e.g., Catherine Borbas, et al., The Role of Clinical Opinion Leaders
in Guideline Implementation and Quality Improvement, 118 CHEST
24S, 26S (Supp. 2000) (noting that interpersonal relationships among
physicians is the most important fact in determining physicians’
adoption of medical innovations and refinements of medical practice,
with local, informal medical opinion being of particular importance);
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decisions likely will reflect the practice style and philosophy of their
HCO colleagues.
1.

Physicians’ Modeling of Their Peers

Peers exert their greatest influence on an individual’s cognitive
schemas in situations of uncertainty.147 Situations of uncertainty cause
unease because individuals can never be sure that their decisions
represent the best or right choice. Modeling one’s peers, however, can
minimize this discomfort, as “safety in numbers” provides reassurance
that the correct decision has been made.148 Conforming to one’s peers
also permits individuals to delude themselves into believing that an
ambiguous situation is not in fact ambiguous, further providing a false
sense of security.149
Because physicians commonly confront uncertainty when making
clinical decisions, not surprisingly they take safety in following the
example of their peers.150 For example, if a physician’s peers generally
treat a disease aggressively, the physician can take comfort in
following her peer’s aggressive approach. Similarly, if her peers believe
newer drugs generally are superior to older drugs, a physician also
likely will favor the newer drugs.
When faced with uncertainty, individuals also may look to their
peers for guidance because it is efficient to do so. As explained by
Professors Thomas Jones and Lori Verstegen Ryan,
[L]earning would be both slow and risky if individuals learned
only by direct experience; their own experiences would not be
extensive enough to allow learning at a significant pace and

Rita Mano-Negrin & Brian Mittman, Theorizing the Social Within
Physician Decision Making, 15 J. Mgmt. Med. 259, 261 (2001)
(discussing the importance of peer influences on physician behavior).
147. See Mano-Negrin & Mittman, supra note 147, at 261 (“Peer influence is
greatest in situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty, where
objective, unambiguous information is not readily available.”).
148. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 85–86 (“[In the face of great uncertainty],
the safest and most comfortable position is to do what others are doing.
The applicable maxim is ‘safety in numbers.’”); cf. Samia A. Hurst et
al., How Physicians Face Ethical Difficulties: A Qualitative Analysis,
31 J. Med. Ethics 7 (2005) (stating that when individuals face difficult
ethical issues, they look for assistance in part “[t]o obtain reassurance
that the correct decision was being made”).
149. Cf. Hall, supra note 69, at 218 (stating that conforming to one’s peers
provides physicians with a false sense of certainty, as it “allows a
(mostly unconscious) escape from having to face up to uncertainty, as
well as engendering a (conscious or unconscious) feeling of security”).
150. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 86 (commenting that physicians take
“safety in numbers” and do what others are doing).
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their mistakes could result in hazardous situations. Much social
learning, therefore, takes place through modeling.151

Imitating others also economizes decision making by allowing
individuals to avoid the time and effort of acquiring information and
comparing alternatives.152
Extending this theory to the clinical setting would suggest that
physicians have a strong propensity to imitate their peers or role
models for reasons of efficiency. Given the high stakes and complexity
involved in medical decision making, learning through direct
experience is both slow and risky.153 In addition, few physicians have
the time to determine the efficacy of various procedures through
careful research and experiment. For example, in deciding whether to
prescribe a new drug over an older drug, a physician may model the
prescribing practices of peers or trusted role models in order to take
advantage of others’ clinical experience with or research on the drugs.
Modeling other physicians thus allows physicians to learn while
avoiding potentially hazardous learning trials or time-consuming
research and experiments.
Physicians also may model their peers for other utilitarian
reasons—namely to secure monetary and nonmonetary rewards. Most
individuals desire to enhance their financial status and thus are

151. Thomas M. Jones & Lori Verstegen Ryan, The Effect of Organizational
Forces on Individual Morality: Judgment, Moral Approbation, and
Behavior, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 431, 436 (1998); see also Ralph Hertwig &
Stefan M. Herzog, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Tools of Social
Rationality, 27 SOC. COGNITION 661, 686 (2009) (“Social learning in the
form of imitation (or, relatedly, advice giving) allows individuals to
learn . . . without engaging in potentially hazardous learning
trials . . . .”).
152. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People
Cope with Uncertainty 30 (2008) (noting that imitation may be
“ecologically rational” when “it is hard or time-consuming to figure out
whether a choice is good or bad”); Mark Pingle, Imitation Versus
Rationality: An Experimental Perspective on Decision Making, 24 J.
Socio-Econ. 281, 281 (1995) (“Rather than comparing alternatives
before making a choice, decision makers often simply imitate the choices
made by others. Imitation may be advantageous when comparing
alternatives is relatively costly.”).
153. Cf. Mary A. Burke et al., Physician Social Networks and Geographical
Variation in Medical Care 2 (Ctr. on Soc. Econ. & Dynamics, Working
Paper No. 33, 2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/reports/2003/7/healthcare%20burke/07healthcare_burke.pdf
(“The correct diagnosis and treatment for a patient can be complicated, and
there may be an opportunity to take advantage of the experience of
others.”). Physicians also may conform to the practice norms of those
around them to protect themselves against claims of malpractice; such
norms often are the prevailing legal standard of care. See id.
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motivated by pecuniary rewards such as higher wages and bonuses.154
Individuals also care about nonmonetary rewards like prestige and
professional advancement.155 They therefore pay close attention to the
rewards and esteem bestowed on others, modeling their behavior after
organizational leaders and role models in the hopes of securing for
themselves monetary and professional rewards.156
A final reason for peers’ influence stems from individuals’
powerful need for meaningful social relationships. The fundamental
motive to belong or fit in causes individuals to desire others’ approval,
as approval is a prerequisite for maintaining interpersonal bonds.157
Consequently, individuals generally conform their attitude and
behavior to the group’s norms in order to ensure the continuation of
the social relationships that come with group membership.158
This theory would predict that physicians adopt the practice
styles and philosophies of their group peers in order to secure their
approval, or at least to avoid their disapproval. In fact, physicians are
known to value their colleagues’ esteem and will avoid clinical
decisions that may evoke criticism from peers.159 For example, in a
survey of cardiologists, not only did twenty-seven percent of
154. See Aaron Ahuvia, If Money Doesn’t Make Us Happy, Why Do We Act As
If It Does?, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 499 (2008) (discussing the desire
for money and the positive feelings that come from receiving money).
155. See Harvey S. James, Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making Through
Organizational Structure, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 43, 46–47 (2000) (“Nonmonetary
incentives
consist
of
promotions
[and]
public
recognition . . . .”).
156. See Jones & Ryan, supra note 151, at 436–37 (“Individuals learn by
observing behavior in others and favoring that which has functional
value—i.e., that which has been rewarded. They are motivated to model
their behavior on this favored behavior because they hope to secure
similar rewards.”).
157. See Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire
for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation,
117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 498 (1995) (stating that the need for approval
is “undoubtedly linked to the fact that approval is a prerequisite for
forming and maintaining social bonds”).
158. See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 155 (stating “that
the desire to be accepted by the group can make individuals susceptible to
conformity effects,” with individuals “experienc[ing] strong pressure to
change their attitudes and behaviors to conform to the group’s norm(s) or
operative standard(s)”); Regan, supra note 145, at 959 (explaining that the
unconscious influence of others stems from the need to belong, which makes
people sensitive to what others think and feel).
159. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 93S (commenting that
as well as other nonfinancial considerations, may have a
on a physician’s behavior); Eddy, supra note 61, at 86
who follows the practices of his or her colleagues
criticism . . . .”).
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respondents report ordering a cardiac catheterization if a colleague in
the same situation would do so, but some physicians acknowledged
having ordered potentially unnecessary cardiac catheterizations in
order to meet peer expectations.160
2.

Looking to Peers Within the HCO

The discussion in Part III.A.1 suggests that a physician’s
cognitive schemas are significantly influenced by her peers within her
HCO. Physicians, however, belong to a number of groups, perhaps the
most important being the medical profession. Having been socialized
to abide by the norms of the profession throughout their medical
education and training, physicians take great pride in fulfilling these
norms and suffer guilt and shame when violating the profession’s
norms.161 Similarly, physicians care deeply about their standing in the
profession.162 In situations of uncertainty, then, they may look to their
peers within the profession rather than modeling their peers within
their HCO. This raises the question of whether a physician’s cognitive
schemas primarily reflect the influence of her peers within her HCO or
the medical profession generally.
As physicians increasingly provide care under the auspices of
larger, more integrated organizations, they are likely to identify more
strongly with their organizational peers, rather than the profession as
a whole. First, individuals primarily model or imitate what they see,
and what they see most often is what others around them are doing.163
As HCOs move toward tighter clinical integration, this increasingly
will bring physicians into closer proximity to one another and
160. See Frances Lee Lucas et al., Variation in Cardiologists’ Propensity to
Test and Treat: Is It Associated with Regional Variation in Utilization?,
3 Circulation: Cardiovascular Quality & Outcomes 253, 253
(2010) (reporting results of survey of cardiologists).
161. Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the
Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341, 391 (2001); see also Town et al.,
supra note 73, at 85S (“Medical education includes one of the most intense
socialization processes of any profession, and the products of these programs
bring strong professional values to the practice setting.”).
162. See William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical
Error, in Accountability: Patient Safety and Policy Reform
159, 164 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004) (discussing why physicians
consider reputation important); Agrawal, supra note 161, at 392 (noting
the importance of professional reputation to physicians).
163. See Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory, in 2 Encyclopedia of
Industrial and Organizational Psychology 729, 729 (Steven G.
Rogelberg ed., 2007) (“Much human learning relies on the models in
one’s immediate environment.”); Albert Bandura, Observational
Learning, in 8 International Encyclopedia of Communication
3359, 3360 (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008) (“Some of the observational
learning is based on the models in the environment one inhabits.”).
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facilitate a teamwork approach to patient care.164 We therefore would
expect physicians affiliated with HCOs—particularly HCOs that
emphasize clinical integration—to primarily model their HCO
colleagues.
Second, as noted in Part III.A.1, individuals conform to group
norms in order to maintain and strengthen their social relationships
with other group members.165 This conformity effect may be
particularly strong in the workplace setting, as the social relationships
formed among work colleagues are often highly valued given the
significant time colleagues spend with one another.166 Indeed, the
influence of peers in the workplace strengthens when workplace
interactions are of greater frequency and intensity.167 Thus, given the
frequent collaborations among HCO physicians, physicians affiliated
with HCOs will likely look to their organizational peers for guidance
rather than the profession generally.168
Several studies support the theory that a physician’s peers within
the HCO exert greater influence over the physician’s schemas than
the profession generally. For example, one study found that surgeons
adopt new procedures more quickly when a peer at the same hospital
164. Cf. Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 386 (“Structures that foster
‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ practice are thought to increase communication,
information transfer, learning, and consultation among physicians.”).
165. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
166. See Evan M. Berman, et al., Workplace Relations: Friendship Patterns
and Consequences (According to Managers), 62 Pub. Admin. Rev. 217,
219 (2002) (explaining that workplaces facilitate the development of
friendships because of “proximity . . . shared experiences,” and “mutual
respect or need”); Patricia M. Sias & Daniel J. Cahill, From Coworkers
to Friends: The Development of Peer Friendships in the Workplace,
62 W. J. COMM. 273, 273–74 (1998) (commenting on the “importance of
peer relationships” in the workplace, “which provide an individual
instrumental and emotional support” and can have a significant impact
on an individual’s life as coworkers become friends).
167. See Jacob Eisenberg, Group Cohesiveness, in 1 Encyclopedia of
Social Psychology 386, 387 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D.
Vohs, eds., 2007) (noting that groups where “members interact more
with each other” tend to be more cohesive); Dana-Nicoleta Lascu &
George Zinkhan, Consumer Conformity: Review and Applications for
Marketing Theory and Practice, J. Marketing Theory & Prac.,
Summer 1999, at 1, 5 (“[T]he amount of interaction between group
members may affect the level of conformity.”); cf. Treviño et al., supra
note 93, at 966 (noting that the “frequency and intensity of interaction
of peers” in the workplace strengthens their influence on an individual’s
ethical behavior).
168. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1018 (stating that peers likely have a
stronger impact in more “formally organized practices, such as health
maintenance organizations (HMOs),” and more “formally organized
hospitals” such as teaching hospitals).
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is an early adopter of the procedure.169 Studies looking at physician
prescribing practices likewise show the influence of other physicians
within the immediate work environment: the likelihood of a physician
prescribing a new drug increases as a physician’s workplace colleagues
increasingly prescribe the drug.170
B. Physicians’ Organizational Identification with HCOs

As noted in Part III.A, individuals have a powerful need for
meaningful social relationships. According to social identity theory,
this leads individuals to not only desire others’ approval but also to
identify with a group or organization to which they belong.171 This
psychological identification with the organization can cause an
individual to feel loyalty to and investment in the organization,
“induc[ing] individuals to take the group’s perspective and to
experience the group’s goals and interests as their own.”172 In
addition, this identification with the organization frequently leads
individuals to internalize the group’s values, norms, attitudes, and
behavior.173 Having internalized the group’s standards and beliefs,
169. Jose J. Escarce, Externalities in Hospitals and Physician Adoption of a
New Surgical Technology: An Exploratory Analysis, 15 J. Health
Econ. 715, 729 (1996).
170. See Shu-Jou Lin et al., Colleague Interactions and New Drug
Prescribing Behavior: The Case of the Initial Prescription of
Antidepressants in Taiwanese Medical Centers, 73 Soc. Sci. & Med.
1208 (2011) (confirming the findings of prior studies, namely that the
likelihood of a physician adopting a new drug is influenced by the
adoption ratio for the drug among the physician’s colleagues).
171. See Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the
Organization, 14 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 20, 21 (1989) (“According to
[social identity theory], the self-concept is comprised of a personal
identity encompassing idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., bodily
attributes, abilities, psychological traits, interests) and a social identity
encompassing salient group classifications. Social identification . . . is
the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human
aggregate.”); Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A
Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58
Soc. Psychol. Q. 255, 259 (1995) (“The basic idea [of social identity
theory] is that a social category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation,
sports team) into which one falls, and to which one feels one belongs,
provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining
characteristics of the category—a self-definition that is a part of the selfconcept.”).
172. Daan van Knippenberg, Work Motivation and Performance: A Social
Identity Perspective, 49 Applied Psychol. 357, 360 (2000).
173. See Ashforth & Mael, supra note 171, at 26 (“[Group identification] may
engender internalization of, and adherence to, group values and norms
and homogeneity in attitudes and behavior.”); Michael Riketta,
Organizational Identification: A Meta-Analysis, 66 J. Vocational
Behav. 358, 361 (2005) (explaining that each member of an
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individuals experience enhanced self-respect when they conform to
group expectations and feel guilt and shame when they fail to do so.174
As physicians move from solo and small group practices to HCOs,
we might anticipate that they similarly will internalize the values,
norms, and goals of their respective HCOs into their cognitive
schemas. Whether they in fact do so, however, depends on both the
intensity of a physician’s identification with an HCO and whether she
identifies more strongly with the HCO or the medical profession
generally.
Membership in an organization does not automatically translate
into a commitment to and internalization of the organization’s goals,
norms, and values. Rather, those individuals who identify strongly
with a group are more receptive to the influence of others in the
group and show greater adherence to group norms than those with a
weaker sense of group identification.175 Moreover, when individuals
organization “link[s] his or her organizational membership to his or her
self-concept
[in
several
ways,
including
by] . . . internalizing
organizational values”).
174. See Simon Taggar & Heather MacDonald, Social Norms and
Conformity, in Encyclopedia of Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, supra note 163, at 738, 739 (explaining that individuals
who “have truly and wholly accepted the beliefs, values and attitudes”
of the group conform “because the norm is seen as right,” and not
because of external forces such as rewards or punishments).
175. See David R. Hekman et al., Effects of Organizational and Professional
Identification on the Relationship Between Administrators’ Social
Influence and Professional Employees’ Adoption of New Work Behavior,
94 J. Applied Psychol. 1325, 1325–26 (2009) (stating that research
has found that “a person’s identification with a group increases the
person’s receptivity to social influence from other group members and
decreases the person’s receptivity to social influence from non-group
members,” and that “organizational identification increases members’
adherence to group norms”). For example, a study of professional
employees found that those who identified strongly with their
organization were more receptive to the influence of administrators
seeking changes in employee behavior. In contrast, those that identified
weakly with the organization were less receptive to administrators’
influence. See id. (summarizing the results of a study on the impact of
organizational identification and professional identification). In the
health care context, studies looking at physician groups found that
practice culture had a larger effect on physician decision making in
those physician groups where physicians reported a stronger sense of
belonging. See Rebecca Shackelton et al., Does the Culture of a Medical
Practice Affect the Clinical Management of Diabetes by Primary Care
Providers?, 14 J. Health Servs. Res. & Pol’y 96, 100 (2009)
(reporting the findings of study on practice culture and physician
decision making for diabetes); see also Lisa Marceau et al., The Relative
Contribution of Patient, Provider, and Organizational Influences to the
Appropriate Diagnosis and Management of Diabetes Mellitus,
17 J. Evaluation Clinical Prac. 1122, 1126 (2011) (reporting the
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belong to multiple groups, the cognitive schemas associated with the
group that the individual identifies most strongly with tend to be
more salient than the schemas associated with other groups.176
Physicians who identify strongly with their respective HCOs and less
so with the medical profession are therefore more likely to apply
cognitive schemas that reflect their respective HCOs’ values, norms,
and goals; in contrast, those with more tenuous connections to their
respective HCOs or stronger professional identifications are less likely
to do so.177
While the degree to which physicians identify with an HCO likely
varies widely, several recent trends may promote stronger ties
between HCOs and their affiliated physicians. First, research suggests
that the growing interdependence between physicians and HCOs will
strengthen physicians’ organizational identification.178 As described in

findings of a second similar study). Similarly, another study found that
physicians who identified more strongly with their health care system
were more likely to engage in cooperative behaviors and organizational
citizenship. See Janet M. Dukerich et al., Beauty is in the Eye of the
Beholder: The Impact of Organizational Identification, Identity, and
Image on the Cooperative Behaviors of Physicians, 47 Admin. Sci. Q.
507, 521 (2002) (reporting the results of a study on organizational
identification).
176. See Hogg, supra note 171, at 258 (explaining that “the more strongly
committed an individual is to [a group] identity . . . the higher the level
of identity salience” in comparison with other identities); Sheldon
Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity
Theory, 63 Soc. Psych. Q. 284, 289 (2000) (“If the competing or
conflicting identifies reflect greatly different commitments and
consequently differ greatly in salience, the identity based on greater
commitment and higher salience will be reflected . . . in the operative
identity standard and perceived self-meanings.”).
177. Cf. Hekman et al., supra note 175, at 1329–30 (finding that
administrators’ social influences were greater for those professional
employees, including physicians, with high levels of organizational
identification and low levels of professional identification and lowest for
professional employees with low levels of organizational identification
and high levels of professional identification).
178. See Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind: Interorganizational
Linkages and Physician-System Alignment, 39 Med. Care I-30, I-40
(Supp. I 2001) [hereinafter Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind]
(finding that physicians who had stronger operational linkages with a
health system had stronger loyalty to the system and more citizenship
behaviors); Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Risk Assumption and Physician
Alignment with Health Care Organizations, 39 Med. Care I-46
(Supp. I 2001) [hereinafter Alexander et al., Risk Assumption] (finding
that physicians with a higher proportion of their revenue from managed
care exhibited higher levels of alignment with their health systems while
those physicians bearing financial risk at the individual level had weaker
alignment with their health systems, presumably because shared risk at
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Part I, physicians increasingly rely on HCOs to provide the capital,
technology, and staff needed to meet the burdens of practicing
medicine.179 HCOs also can help physicians achieve the quality
improvements and efficiencies demanded by recent payment
reforms.180 In addition, changes in health care reimbursement that
impose financial risk at the organizational level tie a physician’s
individual finances to the HCO’s success. This in turn fosters a sense
of “shared fate” among the HCO’s physicians and the HCO.181 Finally,
several studies have found that the rising trend of salaried
employment among HCO physicians also strengthens physicians’
interdependence, and thus identification, with their respective
HCOs.182
Second, today’s HCOs are emphasizing greater clinical
integration. Health experts consider clinical integration a prerequisite
to success under the new payment models that hold providers
accountable for the quality and cost of care.183 By definition, clinical
integration requires frequent collaborations among an HCO’s
providers.184 In addition, physicians in clinically integrated HCOs are
likely to have invested considerable time and energy into improving
the quality, efficiency, and coordination of patient care provided by
the HCO, such as by helping to develop clinical protocols and “best
practices.”185 Greater clinical integration thus promotes stronger
organizational identification among an HCO’s physicians.
the organizational level and managed care increase the interdependence
between health systems and their affiliated physicians).
179. See supra notes 39–60 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
181. See Alexander et al., Risk Assumption, supra note 178, at I-56.
182. See Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 401 (stating that studies of
physicians’ hospital employment found that salaries, along with
stipends, “raised most measures of hospital loyalty, commitment,
retention, trust in the hospital administration, and citizenship
behavior”); Lawton R. Burns et al., Physician Commitment to
Organized Delivery Systems, 39 Med. Care I-9, I-9 to I-10 (Supp. I
2001) (reporting the results of a study finding that physicians who
received a salary or stipend had higher levels of organizational
commitment relative to other physicians, although noting that the
differences were not large); Dukerich et al., supra note 175, at 520–21
(finding that salaried physicians within large health care systems
indicated stronger organizational identification and thus a greater
willingness to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors).
183. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 21 (defining clinical integration).
185. Cf. Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind, supra note 178, at I-40
(stating that physicians with sizeable managed care practices have
stronger identification with their health system, in part, because they
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Finally, today’s HCOs often shy away from the centralized,
bureaucratic controls that characterized many earlier HCOs. Because
physicians highly value their professional autonomy, many physicians
respond negatively to administrative and other formal controls.186 In
fact, the centralized control that characterized early HCOs actually
resulted in decreased organizational identification among HCO
physicians.187 Having learned from the failures of past HCOs, today’s
HCOs are more respectful of physicians’ desires for professional
autonomy. Rather than imposing bureaucratic controls on physicians
that require them to adopt certain practices, many of today’s HCOs
promote physician engagement through collaboration and consensus
building.188 For example, today’s HCOs frequently place physicians in
key leadership positions and employ a collaborative decision-making
process when making strategic or operational decisions.189
Only time will tell whether physicians affiliated with HCOs come
to strongly identify with the organization. Nevertheless, there are
reasons to believe that physicians will in fact do so, gradually
incorporating into their cognitive schemas the norms, values, and
goals of their respective HCOs.

are “likely to have invested considerable time, money and energy into
improving or streamlining their interactions with the system”).
186. See id. at I-31 (stating that “physicians may react negatively to formal
governance and administrative ties that potentially inhibit their
professional autonomy” and that “violations of these cultural norms may
actually decrease physicians’ feelings of identity and alignment with
[health systems]”).
187. See id. at I-40 (finding that centralized control by a health system over
group management and strategic decisions lowered physicians’
organizational citizenship and behavioral commitment).
188. See, e.g., Kreindler et al., supra note 34, at 470–76 (profiling Tucson
Medical Center’s ACO, where participants emphasized physician
engagement through intensive relationship building and collaboration
rather than control, and Norton Healthcare, which focused on building
consensus and team collaboration).
189. See Harbeck, supra note 17, at 50 (“Governance models should include
employed physicians on boards, in executive leadership roles, and on
committees focused on improving quality and reducing costs.”); Edward
A. Kazemek, Physician Collaboration: Is Money the Only Answer?,
Healthcare Exec., July–Aug. 2006, at 54, 54–55 (noting that
hospitals that have successfully formed hospital-physician collaborations
involved physicians in decisions that affect them and created meaningful
leadership roles for physicians); Kathleen D. Sanford, Shared
Governance: One Way to Engage Employed Physicians, Healthcare
Fin. Mgmt., Sept. 2012, at 44, 44 (noting that healthcare systems
such as hospitals “are restructuring their management teams to
include more physicians”).
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C. The Impact of an Organization on a Physician’s Self-Interest and
Cognitive Processes

Classical economic models of individual decision making have long
emphasized the importance of self-interest, conceiving of individuals
as rational, goal-driven decision makers who seek to maximize their
own welfare.190 While the work of cognitive psychologists challenges
economists’ conceptualization of individuals as purposeful, rational
actors, psychological research nevertheless confirms that self-interest
is indeed an important influence on an individual’s decision-making
process.191 Research on cognitive thinking has found that we are
biased to “see what [we] want to see,” and what we want to see is
that the “fair” or “logical” decision is one that also promotes our selfinterest.192 Accordingly, HCOs further influence their affiliated
physicians’ clinical decisions by shaping their self-interests.
1.

Cognitive Motivation, Self-Interest, and the Organization

While many factors shape cognitive thought, the individual’s selfinterest—her wishes, desires, and preferences—plays a key role. When
people have a vested interest in the outcome of their thinking and
reasoning, they have an unconscious tendency to form initial
judgments that suit their desired ends or goals.193 Because these
190. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and
Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1717, 1724 (2001) (explaining
that economic theory rests on the premise that people are motivated by
“a narrow self that is interested only in wealth, power, pleasure, and
prestige”); Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A
Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1189, 1194
(2009) (explaining that “[o]ne of the pivotal underlying assumptions of
economics is Rational Choice Theory,” which assumes that actors “seek
to maximize their expected utility”). While earlier theories defined selfinterest narrowly as centering on pecuniary rewards, contemporary
economists have expanded the concept to include anything of value to
an individual, including gaining others’ approval and upholding one’s
moral values. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra at 1723–24 (distinguishing
narrow self-interest from broad self-interest); Russell Cropanzano et al.,
Self-Interest: Defining and Understanding a Human Motive,
26 J. Organizational Behav. 985, 986 (2005) (explaining that while
classical economics defined self-interest as a concern with pecuniary
payoffs, many contemporary economists would not limit human motives
to such a narrow definition of self-interest).
191. See infra Part III.C.1.
192. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 144 (1997) (stating that, when there is
enough ambiguity to permit it, people see what is in their self-interest).
193. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional
Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2011) (describing “the unconscious
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automatic impressions are “first on the scene,” they play a dominant
part in individuals’ subsequent thinking.194 More conscious, systematic
deliberations generally perform a secondary role, serving to rationalize
or justify individuals’ initial judgments.195 In other words, the
motivation to arrive at a conclusion consistent with one’s self-interest
enhances the use of cognitive schemas—memories, beliefs, and rules—
likely to produce the desired conclusion.196 Psychologists refer to this
dynamic as cognitive motivation.197
Organizations motivate individuals’ cognitions by shaping their
self-interests in numerous ways. Most obviously, organizations provide
tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that suits
some end or goal”). For example, studies have found that individuals
have faster reaction times when generating and endorsing memories and
beliefs consistent with conclusions that promote an individual’s selfinterest or desired ends. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 484 (1990) (summarizing studies
on biased-memory search).
194. See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity,
and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 189, 193
(2004) (“Automatic processes tend to dominate, in part because they
tend to be ‘first on the scene,’ with controlled processes acting as an
override.”); Regan, supra note 145, at 954 (“[Intuitions] represent an
immediate judgment about a situation . . . .”).
195. See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 105 (explaining that deliberative
processes merely endorse individuals’ initial impressions by providing
justifications for them); Regan, supra note 145, at 959–60 (“[W]e
typically engage in moral reasoning after our judgments have been
formed, and . . . we engage in that exercise in order to justify, rather
than arrive at, those judgments.”). This does not mean deliberative
reasoning cannot override our initial impressions—it can—but doing so
requires mobilizing substantial mental focus, something individuals do
infrequently, particularly when their mental capacity is otherwise taxed
by the complexity of the situation or performing other tasks.
See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 81 (describing the “laziness” of
System 2 deliberative cognitive processes); Moore & Loewenstein, supra
note 194, at 193 (stating that although “[c]ontrolled processes can
override automatic processes,” studies have found “that when mental
capacity is constrained because people are under cognitive load, it is
harder for them to engage in reflection and correction of automatic
judgments”).
196. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 480 (“[T]he motivation to arrive at
particular conclusions enhances use of those [cognitive schemas] that are
considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.”).
197. See William M. P. Klein & Matthew M. Monin, Motivated Cognition, in
2 Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, supra note 168, at 593, 593
(“Motivated cognition refers to the influence of motives on various types
of thought processes such as memory, information processing, reasoning,
judgment, and decision making.”); Kahan, supra note 193, at 19
(“What’s meant when an extrinsic goal is said to motivate cognition is
that it directs mental operations . . . .”).
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monetary and nonmonetary rewards to their employees, including
wages, bonuses, promotions, and prestige.198 Not surprisingly, much
research shows that these rewards serve as powerful motivators, with
individuals inclined toward those actions that offer the greatest profit,
opportunities for advancement, or prestige.199
Organizations, however, also provide employees important social
rewards. As discussed in Parts III.A and III.B, individuals have a
fundamental need to form meaningful social relationships, which in
turn leads them to desire the approval of others within the
organization.200 Relatedly, an individual often develops an
identification with an organization, which leads to feelings of loyalty
to the organization and the internalization of the organization’s values
and norms.201 An individual’s self-interest therefore includes not only
the monetary and nonmonetary rewards an organization offers to its
members but also the social rewards of organizational membership
and the interests of the organization itself. When an individual makes
decisions in the organizational setting, these various organizational
rewards and interests motivate the individual’s cognitive reasoning.202
First, the individual generates intuitive judgments or heuristics
consistent with their desire to obtain organizational rewards or
promote the organization’s interests or values.203 Second, the
individual is biased to process and analyze information in a manner
that rationalizes positions congenial to her self-interest as shaped by
the organization.204
198. See James, supra note 156, at 46–48 (describing organizational reward
systems).
199. See Cropanzano et al., supra note 191, at 986 (“Research suggests that
individual profit can be a powerful motivator and, other things being
equal, the greater the potential profit (loss) the stronger its motivational
properties.”); supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. Kahan, supra note 193, at 20–21 (stating that the desire to affirm
one’s membership in a group can reflect a range of goals and needs).
203. See id. at 21 (stating that cognitive processes protective of group
identity “might take the form of rapid, heuristic-driven, even visceral
judgments or perceptions”). For a more general discussion of so-called
defense-motivated heuristics, see Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic
and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inquiry 44, 45 (1999)
(explaining that the desire to form judgments congruent with one’s selfinterest leads to selective use of heuristics, with “[h]euristics that have
judgmental
implications
congenial
to
perceivers’
existing
beliefs . . . especially likely to be used”).
204. See Kahan, supra note 193, at 21 (“[F]ar from being immune from
identity-protective cognition, individuals who display a greater
disposition to use reflective and deliberative (so-called System 2) forms
of reasoning . . . can be expected to be even more adept at using
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HCO Physicians’ Motivated Cognition

The theory of motivated cognition predicts that a physician’s selfinterest, as shaped by her HCO, significantly influences her patientcare decisions. That is, the motivation to reach a clinical conclusion
that promotes the physician’s self-interest may trigger cognitive
schemas that lead to the desired conclusion. A physician’s self-interest
thus affects how she perceives a patient’s situation, her generation
and testing of clinical hypotheses, and the attitudes and values she
applies, particularly in situations of ambiguity. This Part presents
various illustrations of this dynamic.
Cognitive motivation theory indicates that physicians’ selfinterests may affect their initial perceptions and intuitions about a
patient’s situation. For instance, if an HCO provides bonuses to
physicians who reduce the rate of hospital admissions among their
patients, physicians benefit financially when they conclude that a
patient’s condition does not warrant inpatient care. Cognitively
motivated to reach this conclusion, a physician may unconsciously
form initial perceptions and hypotheses about the patient’s condition
that support treating the patient outside the hospital setting.
Motivated cognition similarly may affect a physician’s subsequent
testing of her initial hypothesis about a patient’s condition.
Substantial evidence demonstrates that individuals’ deliberative
cognitive processes are subject to a confirmation bias. In other words,
the schemas accessed by individuals bias them to seek evidence
confirming their initial hypotheses and may even blind them to
contrary evidence.205 Studies confirm that physicians are not immune
to the confirmation bias and that they frequently focus their efforts
on finding clinical evidence confirming their hypotheses rather than
seeking disconfirming evidence.206 The theory of cognitive motivation
technical information and complex analysis to bolster group-congenial
beliefs.”). For a more general discussion of how self-interest
subconsciously biases individuals’ cognitive processing on information,
see Chen et al., supra note 203, at 45 (explaining that the desire to form
judgments congruent with one’s self-interest leads to biased scrutiny,
with “[i]nformation that is congruent with one’s existing
beliefs . . . judged more favorably than incongruent information”).
205. See Harris, supra note 94, at 311 (explaining that the confirmation bias
can “blind individuals to features of the world that threaten the validity
of those schemas” supporting their hypothesis).
206. See Pat Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making:
Cognitive Strategies and Detection of Bias, 9 Acad. Emerg. Med.
1184, 1189 (2002) (contending that a confirmation bias may lead
physicians “to look for confirming evidence to support the hypothesis,
rather than look for disconfirming evidence to refute it”); Hall, supra
note 69, at 221 (“Doctors search harder for evidence that confirms a
decision than disconfirmatory information . . . .”).
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suggests that physicians’ confirmation biases may be particularly
strong when confirming a hypothesis that promotes their selfinterests.
Relatedly, motivated cognition may influence the extent to which
a physician seeks evidence confirming a preliminary diagnosis. Rather
than fully verifying a preliminary diagnosis, physicians at times
prematurely accept a diagnosis on the basis of limited confirmatory
evidence.207 The theory of cognitive motivation predicts that this
“search satisficing” bias is heightened when a physician benefits from
quickly reaching a diagnosis, such as when the HCO rewards the
physician for limiting the number of diagnostics tests she orders.
Motivated cognition also may distort physicians’ treatment of
clinical observations that do not perfectly match their hypothesized
diagnoses, a common occurrence in medicine. When an individual
confronts information that conflicts with his or her desired conclusion,
the confirmation bias may cause the individual to either dismiss such
information as an aberration or recast it so as to be consistent with
the individual’s schema.208 In the medical context, the desire to
confirm a diagnosis has been found to cause physicians to
overemphasize confirmatory data as compared to disconfirmatory
data, to not explore discrepancies between the data and their
hypotheses, or to find grounds for either rejecting discrepancies or
concluding that they are not in fact disconfirmatory evidence.209 In
other words, physicians subconsciously motivated to confirm a
particular diagnosis may be biased to treat aberrations as simply
atypical features rather than as evidence that requires consideration
of alternative hypotheses.
Similarly, motivated cognition may affect physicians’ evaluations
of clinical studies and other scientific evidence. When individuals have
a personal interest in a specific conclusion, they generally give more
weight to supporting evidence and question the validity of
disconfirming evidence.210 For example, studies of biased evaluation of
207. See Croskerry, supra note 206, at 1195 (describing the effects of the
premature-closure bias and search-satisficing bias on clinical decision
making).
208. See Harris, supra note 94, at 311 (explaining how schemas influence the
processing of disconfirming information); Moore & Loewenstein, supra note
195, at 193 (“Research on confirmatory information processing shows that
people assimilate new information through the perceptual lens of their
existing beliefs, in many cases bending facts to fit beliefs rather than vice
versa.”); Kahneman, supra note 90, at 85–88 (describing how the
confirmation bias impacts perceptions and thought processes).
209. See Hall, supra note 69, at 221 (explaining the ways in which physicians
address, or fail to address, disconfirmatory data).
210. See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 103 (discussing the effect of bias on
individuals’ evaluations of relevant information); Moore & Loewenstein,
supra note 195, at 193 (“[I]nformation inconsistent with automatic

502

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
The Myth of the Independent Physician

scientific research found that individuals generally trust evidence that
supports their desired conclusion and disbelieve contrary evidence.211
Of particular interest, when evaluating scientific research, individuals
maintain the illusion of objectivity by accessing beliefs and inferential
rules, or cognitive schemas, that support their defenses of the
favorable scientific research and their criticisms of the disconfirming
studies.212
These findings suggest that physicians may view clinical studies
through biased lenses. For example, if an HCO rewards its physicians
for lowering costs, physicians financially benefit when they prescribe
less expensive therapies over their more costly alternatives. To justify
doing so, physicians may give more weight to studies finding little or
no difference between the less and more costly therapies or may be
dismissive of clinical studies finding that the costly therapy is more
effective.
Motivated cognition also may influence which subset of beliefs,
assumptions, and values guide physicians’ clinical choices, particularly
in conditions of uncertainty.213 Studies have found that self-interest
triggers cognitive schemas that incorporate those beliefs that lead to
decisions consistent with the individual’s self-interest.214 Individuals
also find more convincing those arguments supporting their desired
conclusion as compared to countervailing arguments.215
These cognitive biases may lead physicians to rely on scientific
assumptions or heuristics that support their desired clinical decisions.
judgments tends to be subject to an additional level of scrutiny and is
therefore less likely to be accepted as true.”).
211. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 489–90 (describing the results of studies
on the biased evaluation of scientific research).
212. For example, individuals dismissed the disconfirmatory research for
reasons such as insufficient sample size, nonrandom sample selection, or
the absence of control groups. In contrast, individuals were less critical
of the research methods employed in studies confirming their initial
beliefs. See id.; see also Klein & Monin, supra note 198, at 594
(“[People] are relatively more likely to trust small samples of
information consistent with desired expectations (even when they know
that small samples can be unreliable) and are more critical of messages
threatening desired beliefs.”).
213. See Kunda, supra note 194, at 483 (concluding that research suggests
that people access different beliefs under the influence of different goals).
214. See id. at 484, 493–94 (proposing that individuals do not access all
relevant knowledge when biased; instead their motivations make certain
beliefs more salient).
215. See Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on
Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 253 (2003) (stating
that results from studies “showed a strong tendency to view arguments
supporting an individual’s own position as more convincing than those
supporting the other position”).
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For example, when an HCO rewards a physician based on
productivity, the physician benefits from adopting an aggressive
approach to patient management. Cognitively motivated to treat
patients’ conditions aggressively, the physician may invoke heuristics
that support doing so—for example, “If there is any chance of
alleviating the patient’s condition or extending her life, the procedure
should be performed.” Likewise, the physician may find compelling
those scientific assumptions favoring aggressive treatment, such as the
belief that the patient’s condition will worsen over time.
Finally, motivated cognition may influence how physicians weigh
others’ clinical opinions. Research has found that the motivation to
affirm one’s commitment to an organization affects an individual’s
cognitive reasoning.216 For example, individuals impute greater
knowledge and trustworthiness to their organizational peers and thus
give more credence to their views and behaviors as compared to those
of extraorganizational individuals.217 Accordingly, the theory of
cognitive motivation suggests that physicians who identify strongly
with their HCO will find the views of their organizational peers more
persuasive than contrary opinions.218 For example, if a physician’s
organizational peers believe newer drugs are generally superior to
older drugs, the physician will be motivated to agree with this
viewpoint.
In sum, physicians’ clinical judgments may be subconsciously
biased by their self-interests, as shaped by their respective HCOs’
organizational cultures. This is not to imply that physicians’ clinical
decisions always reflect their self-interests. Because physicians
attempt to be rational and follow their professional ethics, their
capacity for making self-serving clinical decisions is constrained by the
216. See Klein & Monin, supra note 198, at 594 (“The motive to belong,
exemplified by people’s interest in relationships and group memberships,
might also influence various types of cognitive processes . . . .”);
Baumeister & Leary, supra note 158, at 504 (“Group
memberships . . . appear to exert important influences on cognitive
patterns.”); Kahan, supra note 193, at 20 (explaining that affirming
one’s membership in an important reference group can unconsciously
influence cognition, generating a species of motivated reasoning known
as identity-protective cognition).
217. See Hekman et al., supra note 176, at 1326 (“Social identification [with
a group] leads one to see non-group members as less trustworthy, to
evaluate them less positively, and to view them as dissimilar.”); Kahan,
supra note 193, at 20 (discussing ways in which group identity biases
cognitive reasoning).
218. Cf. Judith D. de Jong et al., Mutual Influences of General Practitioners
in Partnerships, 57 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1515, 1516 (2003) (stating that
physicians working in group partnerships that have developed strategies
for dealing with clinical uncertainty are often skeptical “towards
scientific evidence and more sensitive to peer influences”).
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plausibility of the justifications for such decisions.219 For this reason,
when the clinical evidence and standards of care are unambiguous,
physicians’ medical decisions are consistent with the evidence and
prevailing standards of care.220 But when faced with clinical
ambiguity, physicians who genuinely desire to remain objective and
committed to their patients’ welfare may unwittingly use self-serving
cognitive schemas.221 Moreover, because an HCO’s organizational
culture shapes the self-interest of its affiliated physicians, the HCO
indirectly influences those physicians’ clinical decisions.
As this Part has shown, a physician embedded in an HCO
gradually adapts to the HCO’s “way of doing things.” Being part of
an HCO thus fundamentally influences physicians’ patient-care
decisions, particularly in conditions of uncertainty. Because this
process largely occurs outside a physician’s conscious awareness, many
scholars, policymakers, and even health professionals fail to appreciate
the significance of an HCO’s organizational culture. Instead they focus
their attention on the individual physician. Conceptualizing patient
care as provided at the level of the individual physician, however, is a
serious mistake because it fails to recognize the link between an
HCO’s organizational culture and its affiliated physicians’ clinical
decisions. With more and more physicians shifting from solo and small
group practice to HCOs, it is imperative that we abandon the myth of
the independent physician and recognize that patient care increasingly
is a product of an organizational system.

IV. The Importance of HCO Organizational Culture:
Implications for Health Law, Policy, and Ethics
Part III showed that there is a compelling theoretical basis for
concluding that the culture of HCOs greatly influences the treatment
219. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 480, 483 (explaining that because
“people . . . attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of
their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer,”
individuals’ abilities to arrive at the desired conclusions “is constrained
by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these
conclusions”).
220. See John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A
Proposal for Action, 3 Health Aff. 6, 9 (1984) (explaining that there
is less variation among physicians’ clinical decisions when there exists
widespread consensus as to the proper course of treatment because
“clinical judgments are constrained by a consensus”).
221. See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 215, at 253 (“[I]ndividuals are
unable to remain objective, even when they are motivated to be
impartial, demonstrating that self-serving bias is unintentional.”);
Kahan, supra note 193, at 20 (motivated cognition causes a person “who
genuinely desires to make a fair or accurate judgment” to unwittingly
“make a determination that favors some personal interest”).
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decisions of their affiliated physicians. Yet many health laws, policies,
and ethical guidelines focus on the individual physician, seeking to
minimize individual physician’s financial conflicts or holding
individual physicians accountable for inferior care.222 A model of
physician behavior that incorporates the impact of organizational
culture, however, reveals the inadequacies of focusing narrowly on
individual physicians.223 Those involved in health law, policy, and
ethics must therefore give greater attention to the organization.
Because HCOs are heterogeneous organizations, differences in
their organizational cultures may lead to differences in physician
behavior and, ultimately, differences in the quality, modality, and cost
of care provided to patients.224 Of particular concern are
organizational cultures that bias physicians’ clinical decision making
in ways that lead to the provision of inexpert or inefficient care or the
withholding of necessary care. The challenge for health scholars and
policymakers, then, is to determine how best to promote more
virtuous organizational cultures that minimize these risks while
respecting community standards of compassion and fairness. This
Part seeks to begin the conversation on this important issue.
A. HCOs’ Organizational Ethics

As discussed in Part I, primary responsibility for patient care
traditionally fell to individual physicians. Organizations such as
hospitals were relegated to the secondary role of supporting
physicians’ treatment of their patients. Ethical issues related to
patient care thus were matters for the medical profession and not
organizations.225 As a result, medical ethics came to reflect the guiding

222. See supra note 11; infra note 272 and accompanying text.
223. See Flood & Fennell, supra note 12, at 163 (stating that health care
models need to be expanded to fit the complexities of the health care
system, including the noneconomic factors involved, “so that we can
understand the inadequacies of financial-based policies”).
224. Cf. Town et al., supra note 73, at 89S (“Physicians practice in
heterogeneous organizations, which offer differing financial and
nonfinancial incentives that may differentially impact physician
behavior.”).
225. See Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician
Ethics, 24 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 28, 29 (1994) (stating that in the past
the focus of ethics was on the individual physician). At the time,
organizational ethics was limited to business and corporate matters, such
as purchasing decisions and policies related to care for the poor. See
Gerard Magill & Lawrence Prybil, Stewardship and Integrity in Health
Care: A Role for Organizational Ethics, 50 J. Bus. Ethics 225, 227
(2004) (discussing the bifurcation of biomedical ethics related to patient
care and organizational ethics related to business and corporate matters).
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principle of the medical profession, the Hippocratic oath.226 Medical
ethics therefore embraced a patient-centered approach that gave
primacy to patient welfare over societal concerns, such as efficiency
and costs.227
When the 1980s and 1990s ushered in an era of physicians
affiliating with HCOs, health ethics broadened beyond its earlier
professional focus to encompass the organization.228 Nevertheless, the
organization-based ethical principles that emerged continued the
patient-centered focus of the medical profession’s ethics.229
Organizational ethics thus primarily focused on case-centered issues
arising in the care of individual patients, such as termination of
treatment,
patient
autonomy,
informed
consent,
patient
confidentiality, and human subjects research.230
As argued in Part III, the values, attitudes, and beliefs that guide
physicians’ clinical decision making increasingly will reflect not only a
physician’s personal philosophy but also the organizational culture of
her HCO. Organizational ethics therefore should broaden its focus
beyond case-centered, patient-care issues and address how to promote
organizational cultures that inspire appropriate clinical decisions by
the organization’s physicians.231 In other words, organizational ethics
226. See Hall, supra note 18, at 435 (commenting that prior to the arrival of
managed care, medical treatment was dominated by the Hippocratic ideal).
227. See Rorty, supra note 143, at 49 (“Contemporary clinical ethics has
focused almost exclusively on the individual patient and his personal
autonomy, not on the larger community.”); Morreim, supra note 79, at 9–
10 (stating that the system of affluent insurance leads to “cost is no
object” values among physicians as part of a moral commitment to
patients). An insurance system that was highly deferential to physicians’
treatment decisions and reimbursed them their reasonable costs reinforced
these principles. See generally Morreim, supra note 79, at 9–10 (stating
that “the era of affluent insurance” promoted values that focused on
providing patients any potentially beneficial care regardless of cost).
228. See Carrie Zoubul, Healthcare Institutional Ethics: Broader Than
Clinical Ethics, in Health Care Ethics: Critical Issues for the
21st Century 237, 237 (Eileen E. Morrison ed., 2d ed. 2009)
(noting that at the end of the twentieth century, many HCOs began
to focus on ethical issues).
229. See id. at 237–39 (discussing organizational ethics programs).
230. See id. More recently, HCOs have expanded their focus to include
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. See David E.
Guinn, Corporate Compliance and Integrity Programs: The Uneasy
Alliance Between Law and Ethics, 12 HEC F. 292, 292, 295 (2000)
(stating that “corporate compliance programs in health care have
exploded upon the scene” and that such programs are aimed at
“preventing, detecting, and reporting” violations of the law by the
organization and its employees or agents).
231. See Magill & Prybil, supra note 226, at 227 (arguing that an
organizational ethics strategy should seek “to foster a virtuous
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should be reconceptualized as a “more global vision of the elements of
organizational life that affect patient care,”232 with greater attention
given “to the mission and values of the organization and how they are
implemented in daily practice and long-term planning.”233
Health ethicists also should provide more guidance to HCOs on
the content of their mission and guiding values. Although a
comprehensive discussion of the core values of HCOs is beyond the
scope of this Article, clearly a central mission of all HCOs is healing
patients. As such, they are subject to the same ethical expectations
guiding health professionals—a commitment to a patient’s best
interests.234 However, with payment reforms imposing on HCOs
greater responsibility for both the aggregate cost of treating and
overall well-being of patient populations, HCOs also have a moral
obligation to make prudent use of health care resources.235 In addition,
because HCOs must ensure their financial solvency, efficiency
considerations are of paramount importance to them, with for-profit
organizations having the further commitment of maximizing
shareholder wealth.236 Because these core values will at times come
into conflict,237 health ethicists must assist HCOs in developing an
ethical framework for appropriately balancing these values.
Health ethicists similarly should provide guidance to HCOs on
how best to develop an ethics infrastructure for ensuring that the
HCO’s values and priorities are incorporated into the daily life of the
organization whose ethical principles inspire appropriate decision-making
and moral behavior among all its personnel”).
232. Rorty, supra note 143, at 53 (emphasis added).
233. Donna T. Chen & Ann E. Mills, Addressing Ethical Commitments When
Professionals Partner with Organizations, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 719,
728 (2008).
234. See Rorty, supra note 143, at 52 (“Insofar as organizations also are
ethical agents, and instrumentalities of the society for health care, they
are subject to many of the ethical expectations that the society has of
individual providers . . . .”).
235. See Magill & Prybil, supra note 225, at 228 (stating that HCOs’
organizational ethics must integrate stewardship virtues that respect the
resources entrusted to it by the community). See generally Laurence B.
McCullough, A Basic Concept in the Clinical Ethics of Managed Care:
Physicians and Institutions as Economically Disciplined Moral CoFiduciaries of Populations of Patients, 24 J. Med. & Phil. 77, 93
(1999) (commenting on health care institutions’ moral fiduciary
responsibilities for the well-being of their patients).
236. See Chen & Mills, supra note 233, at 721 (“[O]ne commitment of forprofit organizations is to maximize shareholder wealth . . . .”).
237. See id. (noting that organizations such as hospitals face conflicting
commitments, presenting significant ethical challenges to the
organizations).
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organization.238 Any such ethics program should attend to whether the
HCO’s formal structures, policies, and processes reflect and
appropriately balance its core values.239 For example, the HCO’s
reward system, clinical guidelines, and treatment protocols should
align with its espoused values.240 Similarly, the HCO’s ethics program
should foster an organizational culture that, at the informal level,
motivates clinical decisions consistent with its core values and
priorities.
Health ethicists and the medical profession also should consider
whether the shift away from solo and small group physician practices
to large HCOs warrants a revision of physicians’ professional ethics.241
Physicians affiliated with HCOs occupy “two roles—one the
responsible professional whose loyalty is to the standards of the
profession, the other the responsible employee whose loyalty is to the
organization.”242 At times these two roles will conflict: the first
generally requires the physician to put an individual patient’s welfare
above all other considerations, whereas the latter requires the
physician to balance patient welfare with other organizational
prerogatives, such as efficiency and cost considerations.
Resolving this conflict between the existing tenets of physicians’
professional ethics and HCOs’ organizational ethics will be one of the
most important issues confronting health ethicists and the medical
profession. Some scholars have argued that physicians’ first
commitment must be to their professional ethics, with physicians
therefore obligated to put their patients’ welfare above other HCO
prerogatives.243 One must query, however, whether in practice it is
238. See Silverman, supra note 141, at 202 (calling for an ethics
infrastructure that proactively incorporates an HCO’s core values into
the daily life of the organization).
239. See id. at 209 (advocating for “the continuous attention to the
structures and processes that influence[ ] ethical behavior”).
240. See id. at 211.
241. Cf. Wolf, supra note 225, at 28 (stating that the conflict between
physicians’ traditional professional ethics and managed care prerogatives
means “some currently accepted tenets of medical ethics will have to be
clarified, others changed, and the whole supplemented”).
242. Toni Makkai & Valerie Braithwaite, Professionalism, Organizations,
and Compliance, 18 Law & Soc. Inquiry 33, 36 (1993); see also
Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in
Medical Practice 170–71 (1993) (stating that organized medical
practice puts a “physician in a position of double agency—
simultaneously serving the patient, and the institutional policy”).
243. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 Kennedy
Inst. Ethics J. 279, 284–85 (1993) (arguing that even if society desires
to reduce health care costs, physicians should not serve as “double
agents” because their sole obligation is to care for their patients);
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
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realistic to expect physicians to do so given the influence, often at a
subconscious level, of their organizational peers, organizational
identity, and self-interest. More pragmatically, physicians’ professional
ethics should be reshaped to permit “greater sensitivity to values
beyond those of the immediate patient seeking treatment.”244
B. HCOs’ Internal Organizational Arrangements

In recognition of the impact HCOs have on physicians’ clinical
decisions, greater attention should be given to the organizational
causes of deficient patient care, including an organization’s internal
policies and arrangements. To the extent certain internal structures or
arrangements are found to promote a more virtuous organizational
culture, policymakers should consider whether to mandate that all
HCOs adopt such structures and arrangements. Similarly, regulators
may wish to prohibit HCOs from adopting organizational features
associated with less-than-virtuous organizational cultures. In light of
the limited research on this issue, it would be premature to
recommend specific regulatory proposals related to HCOs’ internal
arrangements. This Part instead highlights several organizational
arrangements that may warrant closer examination—mandating that
HCOs adopt formal organizational ethics programs, requiring that
health professionals occupy HCO leadership positions, and prohibiting
for-profit HCOs.
1.

Organizational Ethics Programs

Part IV.A argued that health ethicists should give greater
attention to organizational ethics. Ethical guidance for organizations,
however, will not foster virtuous organizational cultures if ignored by
HCOs. Consequently, regulators should consider whether to mandate
that HCOs adopt formal organizational ethics programs as a condition
of state licensure or eligibility for government health care programs.245
Gatekeeping, 2 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 23 (1986) (arguing
that society must preserve the integrity of a physician’s primary
responsibility to the patient’s interest); Herbert M. Swick, Toward a
Normative Definition of Medical Professionalism, 75 Acad. Med. 612,
614 (2000) (defining medical professionalism as requiring that the
physician treat a patient’s legitimate interests and needs as paramount
over the physician’s own interests and the demands of the health system
employing the physician).
244. Ruger, supra note 7, at 1519–20.
245. For example, HCOs must meet various “conditions of participation” in
order to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For a
general description of these requirements, see Conditions for Coverage
(CfCs) & Conditions of Participations (CoPs), Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Leg
islation/CFCsAndCoPs/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
Similarly, state agencies will only grant licenses to HCOs that meet the
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Requiring HCOs to adopt formal organizational ethics programs
would force “leaders and managers to face the fact that working
through ethical conflicts and deliberating over ethical commitments
should have an important structural presence.”246 In addition,
regulators could require that HCOs broaden their focus beyond ethical
issues arising in individual, patient-care settings and consider the
larger issue of promoting a virtuous organizational culture.247 In
particular, HCOs could be required give attention to how their formal
structures and informal cultures impact physicians’ clinical decision
making.
2.

Health Professionals in Leadership Positions

While a formal organizational ethics program may be a good
starting point for promoting a virtuous organizational culture, they
often “are too easily displayed as window dressings that are honored
only through lip service without any sincere efforts to inculcate their
principles in the thinking and behavior of management and
employees.”248 Attention, then, should be given to other internal
factors influencing an HCO’s organizational culture, including the
composition of the organization’s leadership.
Experts in organizational culture have found that organizational
leaders play a fundamental role in shaping an organization’s culture.249
At the formal level, leaders have responsibility for articulating the
organization’s mission, setting standards of conduct, and allocating
organizational rewards and status.250 Leaders also communicate the
standards established by the state. See Anne L. Rooney & Paul R.
van Ostenberg, Licensure, Accreditation, and Certification:
Approaches to Health Services Quality 3 (1999) (defining
licensure).
246. Chen & Mills, supra note 233, at 735.
247. See generally id. at 730 (“[T]he role of an organization ethics program is
to articulate and promote the healthcare organization’s mission and
values—synthesized from its professional, clinical, and business ethics
commitments—through its activities.”).
248. Mark A. Hall, A Corporate Ethic of “Care” in Health Care, 3 Seattle
J. for Soc. Just. 417, 421 (2004).
249. See, e.g., Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and
Leadership 235–58 (4th ed. 2010) (describing the ways in which leaders
embed and transmit culture); Amy Klemm Verbos et al., The Positive
Ethical Organization: Enacting a Living Code of Ethics and Ethical
Organizational Identity, 76 J. Bus. Ethics 17, 22 (2007) (“Leaders’ key
role in influencing ethical practices in their organizations is well
established in the business ethics literature.”).
250. See Schein, supra note 249, at 237, 247–49, 256–57 (describing how
leaders shape an organization’s culture—through formal statements of
organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters—and how they allocate
rewards and status).
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organization’s norms and values through less formal means, such as
by what they pay attention to, the priorities they set, and their own
conduct.251
Which values and norms an organizational leader chooses to
emphasize is guided by the leader’s own cognitive frameworks, which
in turn reflect the leader’s educational background and professional
training.252 Given the relationship between leaders’ values and their
backgrounds, some have suggested that physicians and other health
professionals should occupy important leadership positions in HCOs.
For example, several commenters on the proposed rule for the
Medicare Shared Savings Program urged the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) to mandate that ACOs be led by
physician CEOs.253 Underlying this and similar proposals is the belief
that leaders who are physicians, or other health professionals, will
promote a more virtuous organizational culture because health
professionals are more likely to balance business considerations with
concerns for patient welfare.254
251. See id. at 236–43, 245–47 (describing various informal ways leaders
shape organizational culture).
252. See John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially
Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 946, 958 (2007) (explaining
that “the cognitive frames, mindsets, conceptions of control, or world
views of corporate managers are important determinants of how
managers run their firms,” and that “[s]cholars emphasize that managers
often learn [their] mental constructs by absorbing the messages that are
transmitted to them at business schools and through the professional
publications they pay close attention to (e.g., the business press, trade
journals)”); cf. Eric Van den Steen, Organizational Beliefs and
Managerial Vision, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 258 (2005) (noting that
studies show that a manager’s policies are correlated with whether or
not he or she attended an MBA program).
253. See Mark A. Warner, Public Comment on RIN 0938-AQ22: Medicare
Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528-01 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011),
Regulations.gov
(June
3,
2011)
(No.
CMS-2010-0259),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0801
(final rule codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (submitting comments on the
proposed rule on behalf of the American Society of Anesthesiologists and
stating that physician leadership of ACOs is essential to ensure ACOs
are patient centric and put patients’ interests first).
254. See Michael Hechter, The Rise and Fall of Normative Control,
33 Acct., Orgs. & Soc’y 663, 666 (2008) (arguing that a physician’s
behavior will differ from a businessperson’s behavior because the norms
of a businessperson “impels him to self-interested action (presumably, he
is motivated to maximize his own profit),” whereas “the physician’s role
requires him to place the welfare of his patient above his own selfinterest, financial or otherwise”); cf. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note
243, at 34 (arguing that individuals with a stronger professional
orientation than business orientation are less likely to violate the law).
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Although CMS rejected the proposal to require that ACOs be led
by physician CEOs,255 the agency’s final rule does require that at least
seventy-five percent control of the ACO’s governing body be held by
representatives of the physicians, hospitals, and other health providers
participating in the ACO.256 CMS and supporters of this governing
requirement argued that it would “ensure that ACOs remain
provider-driven,”257 “patient-centric,”258 and “put[ ] patients’ interests
first.”259 If research supports the assumed link between an HCO’s
leadership and its organizational culture, regulators should consider
whether to impose similar governing requirements on other HCOs.
3.

Nonprofit Status

Some commentators have suggested that nonprofit status also
may promote a more virtuous organizational culture.260 Nonprofits
cannot distribute earnings to owners or shareholders, but instead
must use any surplus to support their operations and mission.261
Consequently, the earnings of nonprofit HCOs are “a means to an
Whether health professionals who occupy leadership positions are less
business oriented and more patient focused than other health care
leaders is a question deserving of further empirical study.
255. See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations,
76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,823 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 425) (responding to comments and expressing the agency’s “belie[f]
that ACOs should have flexibility to determine their leadership and
management structure”).
256. 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(3) (2013) (setting forth requirements related to
the composition of an ACO’s governing body); id. § 425.20 (defining the
term “ACO participant”).
257. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,819.
258. Asa C. Lockhart, Public Comment on RIN 0938-AQ22: Medicare
Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528-01 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011),
Regulations.gov (June 17, 2011) (No. CMS-2010-0259), http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0951 (final rule
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (submitting comments on the proposed
rule on behalf of the Texas Medical Association).
259. Id. CMS also requires that the ACO governing body include a Medicare
beneficiary who is a patient of the ACO. 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(2)
(2013). This requirement also is intended to promote a patient centered
culture. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,826
(explaining the rule stems from the Affordable Care Act’s requirement
that ACOs be patient centered).
260. See generally Hall, supra note 248, at 419–20 (arguing that nonprofit
form may promote a culture of “caring” among HCOs).
261. See Howard L. Oleck & Martha E. Stewart, Nonprofit
Corporations, Organizations, and Associations 10–11 (6th ed.
1994) (defining nonprofit organizations).
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end”—supporting the HCO’s health care mission—“rather than an
end in itself.”262 Although for-profits also may have goals beyond
making money, the conventional wisdom is that these other objectives
are secondary to their profit-making mission.263 Nonprofit HCOs are
therefore assumed to have a deeper commitment to their mission of
patient care than their for-profit counterparts.264
If these assumptions are indeed correct, the organizational
cultures of nonprofit and for-profit HCOs may differ in important
respects. A greater commitment to their health care mission on the
part of nonprofit HCOs may give rise to organizational cultures that
reflect a fairer balancing of patient welfare, cost, and efficiency
concerns.265 In contrast, the cultures of for-profit HCOs may
overemphasize efficiency and cost saving concerns,266 leading the forprofit HCO’s physicians to make unwarranted compromises in patient
care.
The objections to for-profit HCOs have proven controversial, with
much debate over whether for-profit status actually promotes less
virtuous organizational cultures and poorer patient outcomes.267
Recent high-profile controversies involving for-profit health systems,
however, raise questions about whether the fears expressed by critics
of for-profit HCOs may be justified.268 While admittedly it would be
262. Hall, supra note 248, at 419.
263. See id. (“For-profit companies also have mission statements that seek to
guide their corporate culture, but at least for publicly traded companies,
we have to assume that the substantive mission is secondary to the goal
of an increasing return on an equity investment.”).
264. See id. (suggesting that nonprofit companies “tend to stick to their
mission and treat it more seriously as their main purpose for existence”).
265. See id. at 419–20 (suggesting that because nonprofit companies in
general are more committed to their missions, nonprofit HCOs are more
likely to have a culture of caring); Arnold S. Relman, Could Physicians
Take the Lead in Health Reform?, 304 JAMA 2740, 2741 (2010)
(stating that nonprofit multispecialty physician groups are “appealing
because their professional values and their concern for the quality of
care would outweigh commercial incentives”).
266. See generally Arnold S. Relman, A Second Opinion: Rescuing
America’s Health Care 36–37 (2007) (arguing that the
entrepreneurialism inherent in investor-owned health care leads to a
focus on the bottom line).
267. Wolf, supra note 225, at 37 (stating that objections to for-profit status
“are controversial, with much debate about whether the data show
actual and negative effects on physician decisions”). See generally Jack
Needleman, The Role of Nonprofits in Health Care, 26 J. Health Pol.
Pol’y & L. 1113 (2001) (discussing whether tax policy should continue
to promote nonprofit health care institutions).
268. For example, Health Management Associates (HMA), the fourth largest
for-profit hospital chain in the country, allegedly promoted a culture
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imprudent to require HCOs to be nonprofit on the basis of a few
wayward for-profit HCOs, the issue merits greater attention given the
recent growth in HCOs.
C. Organizational Accountability for Patient Care

Because the clinical decisions of HCO physicians reflect the
organizational values and norms of their HCO, patient care should be
viewed as a product of an organizational system. Health law and
policy therefore should impose greater accountability on HCOs for the
cost and quality of patient care. While recent reforms in Medicare
reimbursement policies have moved in this direction,269 others areas of
health law and policy continue to focus on individual physicians.
Part IV.C discusses two reforms that would shift the focus to HCOs:
enterprise medical liability and monitoring organizational patterns of
care.
1.

Enterprise Medical Liability

Malpractice law traditionally focused on individual actors, holding
physicians individually accountable when their treatment of a patient
deviated from accepted standards of care.270 Rarely did courts hold
organizations liable for a physician’s deficiencies. Over the past few
decades, however, courts have expanded organizations’ liability for
malpractice under the doctrines of vicarious liability and corporate
negligence.271 Yet as expansive as these bases for HCO liability may
that valued revenue generation at the expense of patient care.
Specifically, the company rewarded physicians who ordered numerous
diagnostic tests and frequently admitted patients to the hospital,
potentially exposing patients to unnecessary risks. This reward structure
allegedly influenced HMA physicians’ clinical decisions, such as biasing
them to find medical conditions that would justify admitting a patient
to the hospital. See 60 Minutes: The Cost of Admission (CBS television
broadcast Dec. 2, 2012) (investigating the clinical practices of Health
Management Associates).
269. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing Medicare
payment reforms).
270. See, e.g., Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 974 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (explaining that for years the majority of courts treated
physicians as independent actors who were not subject to control by
hospitals).
271. Under the theory of respondeat superior, hospitals and other institutions
are liable for the negligence of physicians who are either employees or
agents of the hospital. In determining whether a nonemployee physician
is an agent of the hospital or organization, some courts have moved
away from the traditional “control” test to instead consider whether
there is a significant relationship between the physician and the
organization. See id. at 974–78. Under the doctrine of apparent or
ostensible agency, courts will hold a hospital or organization vicariously
liable for the negligent acts of a nonagent physician if the hospital holds
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be, various doctrinal obstacles frequently bar injured patients from
recovering from HCOs.272 Many malpractice cases therefore focus
solely on the conduct of individual physicians, treating physicians as
isolated actors and ignoring the impact of HCOs’ organizational
culture on physicians’ patient-care decisions.
In contrast to current malpractice law doctrine, the theory of
enterprise liability shifts liability for negligence from individual actors
to the enterprise.273 Enterprise liability in the malpractice context
would place sole legal responsibility for deficient patient care at the
level of the organization rather than holding individual physicians
liable.274 In doing so, enterprise liability would recognize patient care
as the product of organizational forces.
Although proposals for enterprise medical liability are not new,
recognition of the close link between organizational culture and
patient-care decisions provides a new justification for such
itself as the provider of care and the plaintiff-patient relies on such
representation or reasonably believes the physician to be an employee or
agency of the organization. See id. at 977. Finally, hospitals and other
organizations may be liable when their own negligence contributes to a
physician’s substandard care. For example, hospitals have been held to
have a duty to grant staff privileges only to competent physicians. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Misercordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
Courts have also found a duty to supervise the care provided by
physicians and other health care professionals employed or affiliated
with the hospital. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp.,
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
272. For example, when the physician separately bills the patient, and the
patient selects the physician caring for her rather than looking to the
hospital to do so, courts do not consider the physician an agent of the
hospital. See, e.g., Adamski, 579 P.2d at 975 (“[W]here the patient
contacts his personal physician and is by him admitted to a hospital for
treatment, and the doctor looks directly to the patient for his fees, the
courts uniformly treat the physician as an independent contractor.”). In
some jurisdictions hospitals and other organizations can defeat a claim
under the theory of apparent agency if the organization informs the
patient that the physician is an independent contractor. See, e.g.,
Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. 1998)
(ordering summary judgment for the defendant-hospital on plaintiff’s
apparent agency claim when the hospital had posted signs in the
emergency room notifying patients that its emergency room physicians
were independent contractors and the plaintiff had signed a patientconsent form stating the same).
273. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 153, 158 (1976) (defining enterprise liability as imposing
onto an enterprise the losses to society caused by that enterprise).
274. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 381, 383 (1994) (stating that under enterprise liability the
organization would bear all liability for medical malpractice).
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proposals.275 Specifically, enterprise liability would recognize that
organizational norms and values may contribute to errors in
physicians’ professional judgments, such as incorrect diagnoses or
selecting deficient plans of treatment. By imposing sole legal
responsibility for medical errors on HCOs, enterprise liability would
motivate HCOs to pay closer attention to how their organizational
culture may contribute to poor medical decision making by their
affiliated physicians.
2.

Monitoring Organizational Patterns of Care

As described in Part I, various payment reforms tie an HCO’s
reimbursements to its performance on selected quality measures. For
example, ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
275. Proponents of enterprise medical liability previously have argued that
enterprise liability offers numerous advantages over the traditional
malpractice system, including a more efficient system of malpractice
insurance and compensation. For example, Abraham and Weiler have
argued that enterprise medical liability would result in a superior
insurance system, as an organization’s claims experience is more
predictable and stable than an individual physician’s claims experience.
Id. at 403. Others have similarly argued that enterprises are “a superior
fund for compensation and a superior risk-spreading instrument.” Barry
R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing
Care and Managing Risk, 39 St. Louis U. L.J. 79, 110 (1994).
Proponents also argue that enterprise liability would reduce litigation
costs by eliminating multiple defendants. See Abraham & Weiler, supra
note 274, at 406; Furrow, supra at 112. Proponents of enterprise liability
further claim that enterprise liability would promote better physician
adherence to clinical guidelines and encourage greater cooperation
between physicians and institutional providers such as hospitals. See E.
Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and
Medical Malpractice, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 939, 974 (1999)
(stating that because enterprise liability relieves physicians of individual
liability for malpractice, they may more readily participate in
cooperative decision making and be less resistant to clinical practice
guidelines). Finally, proponents argue that enterprise liability would
improve the quality of patient care by enhancing HCOs’ incentives to
reduce medical errors or mishaps, such as by implementing system-wide
processes that would prevent avoidable infections or complications from
adverse drug interactions. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 274, at
408–12 (arguing that individual-based malpractice insurance dilutes the
direct financial incentives to enhance the quality of care due to the
absence of experience rating, whereas under enterprise liability
premiums can be based on the enterprise’s claims experience, and that
enterprise liability gives institutions an incentive to take a systemsapproach to preventing or catching errors); Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A.
Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability
Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 235 (2003) (stating
that by imposing vicarious liability on health care systems, enterprise
liability provides an incentive to take steps to minimize the opportunity
for medical errors).
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Program receive an overall performance score based on their
performance on various quality measures, with those ACOs receiving
a higher performance score awarded a higher shared savings bonus.276
Policymakers contend that holding HCOs financially accountable for
their performance on various quality measures will protect patients
from poor-quality care.277 However, as I have discussed elsewhere,
quality measures provide incomplete protection against poor-quality
care given their inherent limitations, particularly for those domains of
patient care characterized by uncertainty.278
To guard against inappropriate or poor-quality care, regulators
also should monitor HCOs’ patterns of care. Comparing HCOs’
utilization rates across a range of medical interventions would allow
regulators to identify those HCOs with organizational cultures that
lead to inappropriate patient-care decisions. While we would expect to
see some variation in patterns of care across HCOs, significant
deviations from the norm may be indicative of an organizational
276. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.502(e) (2013) (outlining the process for calculating
quality performance scores for participating ACOs); id. § 425.604(d)
(providing that an ACO’s shared savings payment will vary based on its
quality performance score); id. § 425.606(d) (same); see also Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed.
Reg. 69,802, 67,899–90 (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (outlining the
points to be allocated under the performance scoring system and noting
that the resulting score will be used to calculate an ACO’s shared
savings payment).
An ACO is ineligible for the shared savings bonus if it fails to meet the
minimum attainment level, that is, the thirtieth percentile, on at least
one measure in each of the four domains. 42 C.F.R.
§ 425.502(d)(2)(iii)(B) (2013). See generally id. § 425.502(b)(3) (setting
the minimum attainment level); id. § 425.502(d)(1) (establishing four
domains for quality measures: “Patient/care giver experience,” “Care
coordination/Patient safety,” “Preventative health,” and “At-risk
population”). Furthermore, an ACO that fails to score at or above the
minimum attainment level on seventy percent of the performance
measures in each domain may be subject to actions by CMS, including a
warning, corrective action plan, or termination from the program.
Id. §§ 425.216, 425.502(d)(2)(ii).
277. See Eric C. Schneider et al., Payment Reform: Analysis of
Models and Performance Measurement Implications 32, 38
(2011) (stating that a key role of performance measures in a global or
shared savings payment model is to ensure that quality does not decline
and that HCOs, such as ACOs, do not reduce care inappropriately as
they seek to reduce the cost of treating patients); Gregory J. Pelnar &
Gretchen M. Weiss, Rule of Reason Analysis for Accountable Care
Organizations, 11 Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2011) (stating that one
purpose of quality measures is to prevent HCOs such as ACOs from
undertreating patients).
278. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1428–35 (concluding that quality measures
provided incomplete protection against poor-quality care).
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culture that promotes unnecessary care or the withholding of
appropriate care. Oversight agencies can then take appropriate
enforcement action against HCOs with questionable patterns of care,
such as bringing an action for fraudulent claims under the False
Claims Act.279

Conclusion
While health care reform takes important steps toward the goal of
universal access to medical care, many challenges remain. In
particular, the United States must address rising health care costs and
deficiencies in the quality of care. In addition, as we move toward
payment models that will require providers to ration health care, we
face the challenge of how best to ensure that they do so fairly.
Addressing these fundamental issues requires that we understand how
physicians make clinical decisions, with particular attention given to
how HCOs’ organizational cultures influence the cognitive frameworks
that guide physicians’ decision making. This Article fills this gap in
our understanding by providing a theory of how an HCO’s
organizational culture affects its physicians’ clinical judgments.
Too frequently commentators narrowly focus on the individual
physician, failing to appreciate the profound impact an organization’s
culture has on the quality, cost, and modality of patient care. Of
special concern are health organizations with cultures that bias
physicians’ clinical decision making in ways that result in poor-quality
or inefficient care. Commentators should revisit areas of health law,
policy, and ethics that address patient care, inquiring as to whether
they give due consideration to the role of the organization. Particular
attention should be given to identifying legal and regulatory reforms
that will advance more virtuous organizational cultures. Part IV of
this Article begins the discussion of this important issue.
Such reform efforts would benefit from additional conceptual and
empirical work on the link between HCOs’ organizational cultures and
physicians’ decision making. In particular, there is a need to better
understand how physician behavior and patient outcomes differ in the
context of varying organizational environments. For example, research
identifying the cultural attributes of HCOs that most contribute to
high-quality, efficient care would assist policymakers in their
279. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006) (requiring the Attorney General to
“diligently . . . investigate a violation under section 3729” and allowing a
civil action by the Attorney General if a violation is found). In recent years
the United States Department of Justice and the Office of the Inspector
General for the United States Department of Health and Human Services
have prosecuted health care providers for poor-quality care under the False
Claims Act. See Tracey E. Miller & Valerie L. Gutmann, Changing
Expectations for Board Oversight of Healthcare Quality: The Emerging
Paradigm, 2 J. Health & Life Sci. L. 31, 55 (2009).
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regulation of HCOs. Admittedly, reforming health law, policy, and
ethics on the basis of the limited research on these questions is
fraught with risk. Nevertheless, the growing trend of physicians
entering into closer affiliations with HCOs demands that we begin
doing so.
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